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Presentation
EXCErPTA E DISSErTATIoNIBUS IN SACrA THEoLogIA
Resumen: En esta tesis, se explora el desarrollo del 
debate acerca de lo sobrenatural según Henri de 
Lubac. Primero, se explica el pensamiento incluido 
en sus obras, con particular atención a Surnaturel. 
Segundo, se da un panorama sintético de cómo se 
ha contado el debate y qué cuestiones surgieron en 
manuales de teología, historias, diccionarios, en-
ciclopedias, y artículos en el período 1980 a 2010. 
Particular énfasis se da al mundo teológico-acadé-
mico europeo. Tercero, se cuenta un nuevo debate 
entre teólogos de lengua inglesa, particularmente 
John Milbank y Lawrence Feingold. Vemos cómo la 
relación entre la naturaleza del hombre y la acción 
de Dios en él se desenfoca cuando se plantea la 
cuestión en términos de deseo natural, y cómo un 
análisis del intelecto en el hombre puede ser útil para 
entender esta relación.
Palabras clave: sobrenatural; De Lubac; gracia.
Abstract: In this thesis, I explore the development of 
the debate on the supernatural according to Henri 
de Lubac. First, I look at the thought included in his 
works, with particular attention to Surnaturel. Second, 
I give a synthetic view of how the debate has been told 
and what questions have arisen in theology manuals, 
histories, dictionaries, encyclopedias and articles in 
the period from 1980 to 2010. I have given particular 
emphasis to writers in the European academic theo-
logical world. Third, I recount a new debate between 
English language theologians, particularly John Mil-
bank and Lawrence Feingold. We see how the relation-
ship between the nature of man and the action of God 
in him loses focus when considered in terms of natural 
desire, and how an analysis of intellect in man can be 
useful for understanding the relationship without en-
ding up in dead ends.
Key words: supernatural; De Lubac; grace.
In 1946, A French Jesuit named Henri de Lubac published a work entitled 
Surnaturel. This book sought to provide a history of the term and the concept. 
In a brief conclusion, he made the argument that, practically since the time 
of St Thomas Aquinas, theologians, most particularly after Cajetan, had mis-
understood the relationship between human nature and god. The ascent of 
the category «supernatural» in theology had created a two-planed existence 
for man in which nature and supernatural did not really affect each other. De 
Lubac opined that this separation was at the root of the secularization of soci-
ety, and was not itself traditional.
The thesis occasioned a storm of controversy in the theological world, 
as it seemed to question the whole way Catholic theology was done. Eminent 
and well-known theologians launched a devastating critique of de Lubac, and, 
it also appears, were behind his removal from teaching. Yet, his friend Étienne 
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gilson would claim that his scholarship could not be doubted. By the eve of 
the Second vatican Council (1962-5), the theological climate had changed 
considerably, to such an extent that his thought on the supernatural, although 
it continued to be questioned in some part by such theologians as giuseppe 
Colombo and Juan Alfaro, became the accepted position on the supernatural 
question.
In 1965, he published two works, Augustinisme et théologie moderne and Le 
mystère du surnaturel, in which he recasts his thesis to account for the concern 
of Humani generis. Finally, in 1980 he published a little work, Petite catéchèse 
sur nature et grâce, in which he argues that the nature/supernatural dialetic 
should be replaced by one of nature and grace. In the course of this work we 
have seen the importante of this work where De Lubac’s position is much 
more nuanced.
The debate over the supernatural was one of the great theological de-
bates of the 20th century which directly affected the way theology was done. 
Many of the questions which came about the in the debate are still open today, 
such as what St Thomas Aquinas meant by natural desire for god and the 
value of the concept of pure nature, a theological category which De Lubac 
dismissed as useless.
Now, with some distance from the passion with which the original debate 
was fought, numerous studies have appeared elucidating the legacy and the 
limits of De Lubac’s position. As there is now an ample literature on this topic, 
it seemed opportune to study it in this thesis.
Here we try to closely study the history of the debate, determining the 
precise points of discussion. But we also wish to look at how the debate has 
been recounted and how it has been explained, particularly in manuals of the-
ology. We also examine the work of some well-known theologians who have 
drawn out conclusions based on their reading of the debate, developing other 
perspectives and correcting some aspects of it. At the same time, the debate 
has come back to life unexpectedly, as we shall see, in a very much changed 
context, that of the new school of radical orthodoxy.
To prepare this thesis, I have read everything De Lubac has written on 
the supernatural problematic. I then studied how the story of that debate has 
been told, and how conclusions based on the debate appear in manuals, his-
tories of theology, dictionaries, encyclopedias and articles. Finally, I have also 
studied the most important works that re-propose and develop further the 
original questions that remain.
presentation
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The complexity of the discussion and its many facets, as well as its intri-
cate history, makes a linear analysis of all of the numerous themes associates 
with the supernatural problematic difficult. It is necessary to define each posi-
tion with great carefulness and precision. But we hope to provide a sustainable 
status quaestionis on the supernatural question as proposed by De Lubac as 
presented in the here and now.
This history has two main periods: the first, which is from the publica-
tion of Surnaturel to shortly before vatican II, that of the original debate; and 
second, after a period of almost complete silence, a second period from 1980 
to 201, where the original debate has been investigated and re-envisioned.
My thesis is organized in the following manner: an introduction, three 
parts with two chapters and a conclusion each, and a general conclusion.
Part One
The first part is entitled De Lubac and the Debate over the Supernatural in the 
First Half of the 20th Century.
1) Chapter one: De Lubac and Surnaturel. This is a biographical intro-
duction to De Lubac which recounts his theological career and explores his 
work on the natural desire for god and the supernatural, not only in his fa-
mous 1946 book, but afterwards as well.
2) Chapter Two: The Debate over Surnaturel. I note that the publication 
of Surnaturel occasioned much criticism, such as that of garrigou-Lagrange, 
Charles Boyer and Marie-rosaire gagnebet. Colombo provided the first history 
and evaluation of the debate and Alfaro provided a historical survey of the super-
natural question since the time of Cajetan, with particular reference to De Lubac. 
I would find in my research that these two thinkers, who provide a well-informed, 
balanced and profound critique, would largely be ignored by later writers.
Part twO
The second part is entitled Theologians Revisit the History of the Debate and 
Questions Raised By It 1980-2010.
3) Chapter Three: Theologians Confront the History over the Debate on Sur-
naturel 1980-2010. In this chapter, we see how the debate over the supernatu-
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ral has been told in histories of theology, manuals and articles. Many of them 
do not add anything particularly new, but limit themselves to explaining a few 
topics which had already been well established. Among the most interesting 
articles which recount and evaluate the debate, we find the work of Flick-
Alzseghy, Ladaria and Nicolas. We also look at the work of Forte, Komon-
chak, Berzosa, Sesboüé, Mettepennigen, Kerr, Illanes, Sayés and Lorda. The 
work of Susan Wood, galván and Ladaria suggests that the key to interpreting 
De Lubac on the supernatural is through the hermeneutic of paradox. In this 
chapter we also explore the rise of a new discipline called theological anthro-
pology, which can be considered a fruit of that debate.
4) Chapter Four: Themes in the Theology of the Supernatural After De Lubac 
1980-2010. As I read through the literature on the history of the debate, I 
came across numerous themes which merited further study, because they had 
to deal with historiography of the debate. For example, some authors high-
lighted as part of their recounting the history of the debate the weaknesses and 
stregths of the Thomistic account of nature and grace.
I look at several unique voices from the readings who, in their discussion 
of the history, indicate several themes that I think are worth exploring further: 
Kerr and Komonchak’s reading of the debate in terms of a political struggle 
in French society, Sayès on the connection between De Lubac and liberation 
theology, and Cardinal Siri’s critique in his 1980 book Gethsemane.
Part three
The third part is entitled Theologians Re-Propose Certain Systematic Aspects of the 
Supernatural Question 1980-2010.
5) Chapter Five: Re-Proposing Aspects of the Supernatural Question in The-
ological Journals 1980-2010. I examine several imporant themes that are part 
of the supernatural question: pure nature, original sin and pura naturalia, and 
the theory of the dual ends of man. I recall Donneaud’s proposal for a recov-
ery of Marie-Joseph guillou’s critique of De Lubac, as well as the critique of 
Cardinal ruini, who usefully examines the interface between De Lubac and 
Thomism. We pay particular attention here to a colloquium held in 2000 by 
the journal Revue thomiste in Toulouse, which explored the possibility of a 
synthesis between the thought of De Lubac and Thomistic positions on the 
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supernatural. We also look at the work of Louvain professor vanneste, who 
has brought his own sometimes surprising personal perspectives to these same 
questions.
6) Chapter Six: Anglophone Theologians Engage De Lubac for the 21st Centu-
ry. In 2001, Lawrence Feingold published a dissertation in which he concludes 
that, while De Lubac was right to address the fact that contemporary man had 
lost the sense of the supernatural, he was wrong to look for it in nature, in the 
élan of the spirit. His work was severely criticized by John Milbank, the pro-
genitor of a new school of theology called Radical Orthodoxy, which held that 
De Lubac was not courageous enough in accepting the logical consequences 
of his thought on the natural desire for god. I examine here several commen-
tors on that debate, particularly oakes, Long, and reinhard Hütter.
The greatest contribution of this present work seems to be the detailed 
study of all of those aspects which can provide a relatively complete status 
quaestionis on the supernatural, both about the original debate as well as its 
contemporary situation. Each part of the work presents its own conclusions, 
and in the final conclusion we present more general ones based on the study.
The Conclusion is composed of two parts: the first is a list of conclusions 
drawn from my study; the second is a list of problems identified during my 
study which merit further reflection.
It is clear that the publication of Surnaturel in 1946 was a watershed in 
theological history. It contributed dramatically to a change in theological 
method and left many open questions.
Henri De Lubac went from being a theologian suspected by the most 
rexcognized authorities in theology, who saw him against the backdrop of the 
Modernist crisis, to one of the principal theologians of the 20th Century and 
one of the chief protagonists of the Second vatican Council.
This fact has tended to deform a proper historical perspective on the 
debate. What was flatly rejected in the 1950s came to be accepted prima 
facie in the 1970s, almost without any objection. In the theological litera-
ture of the period 1980-2010, De Lubac appears as the principal figure in 
the supernatural debate of the 20th century. The critiques of those such as 
garrigou-Lagrange, Boyer and gagnebet, appear as little more than cari-
catures. Even those who still wished to maintain as much of the scholastic 
Thomistic framework as possible were eager to find a way to integrate some 
of De Lubac’s intuitions.
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Yet, much of what came from the debate has still not been satisfacto-
rily resolved. Sesboüé notes that De Lubac was always on the defensive, 
charging that his work was misunderstood, but without ever answering the 
principal objections, even those of thinkers such as Alfaro and Colombo. 
Here we see the true value of De Lubac’s Petite catéchèse, which, even though 
it is considered a minor work, remains the French Jesuit’s most successful 
one. Unfortunately, like the work of Alfaro and Colombo, it has been largely 
ignored.
Still today we must continue to ask the same questions that piqued De 
Lubac’s curiosity: if the desire for god belongs to the natural order, how can 
we salvage the sovereignty and free will of god? If, as Humani generis states, 
god could have created man and not destined him to the beatific vision, how 
can we say that man has a natural desire for god, a desire which would then 
be frustrated?
Before attempting to answer these questions, there must be a careful 
analysis of the thought of St Thomas on natural desire, because it has been 
the source of numerous misunderstandings.
Ironically, in the same period, many theologians began to believe that 
the supernatural had become irrelvant as a theological category. What had 
dominated De Lubac’s thought for his entire theological career virtually dis-
appeared.
Feingold’s 2001 dissertation, which is a highly specialized study on the 
desire for god in St Thomas, has caused the question to be re-opened in the 
English-speaking world, particularly thanks to its engagement by radical or-
thodoxy. Yet this debate, like the original debate, suffers from deplacement of 
the important issues in understanding the supernatural problematic.
When St Thomas speaks of the desire for god, he thinks not in terms of 
an affective inclination, but in the very structure of intellect, which, because 
it is made to know, is open to all that can be known, including the divine es-
sence. In this sense, the intellect is radical openness to the infinite, and god 
Himself, who is most knowable. When De Lubac writes of the élan d’esprit in 
the conclusion of Surnaturel, this is what he is after, but in doing so, he passes 
from the ontological order in which St Thomas proposes the idea, to the psy-
chological, in which, for example, St Augustine proposes it. «You have made 
us for you, LorD, and we are restless until we rest in you.» It is here that we 
can truly begin to see where the supernatural problematic arises, as well as the 
manifold possibilities for misunderstanding.
presentation
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The excerpt which follows is taken from chapter 6 of the thesis, entitled 
Anglophone Theologians Engage De Lubac for the Twenty-First Century. It focuses 
on the debate in the English-speaking world over De Lubac’s thought princi-
pally in the work of Feingold and Milbank.
* * *
The theological faculty at the University of Navarre have been very help-
ful and have provided a beautiful environment for theological reflection and 
research. My most profound gratitude goes to my Doktorvater, Don Juan Luis 
Lorda. His breadth of vision, profundity of learning, and ability to steer me in 
the right direction have been invaluable. I count myself privileged indeed to 
have drawn from the well of his wisdom and expert guidance.
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Anglophone theologians engage De Lubac 
for the twenty-first century
A s the 2000 Colloquium at the Institut Catholique in Toulouse on de Lubac and the supernatural came to a successful conclusion, little did its participants know that the fraternal dialogue that characterized their 
conference would soon be followed by a debate the proportions of which can 
compare to what happened after the initial publication of Surnaturel. As the 
interventions were prepared for a double issue of Revue thomiste to appear the 
next year, an American student was preparing a doctoral defense that would 
spark this renewed debate. While many theologians had long cast the super-
natural question and De Lubac into the dustbin, contemporary Thomists of 
the Toulousian School, and the heirs apparent of the nouvelle théologie in the 
so-called Communio school of theologians, had come to a modus vivendi which 
integrated much of De Lubac’s thought into mainstream Catholic theology. 
Lawrence Feingold, who prepared his thesis under Alfonso Chacón (b. 1952) 
and Stephen Brock (b. 1957), at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in 
rome, was about to challenge the delicate status quo in a way which for many 
entered the stage of theological drama as a character foreign to the developing 
plot line, a ghost of theologies past, and irresistible to watch.
Feingold’s work was originally published by Apollinare Studi in rome 
and later in a second edition published by Sapientia Press of Ave Maria Uni-
versity1. Far from being an obscure doctoral dissertation gathering dust on 
the shelves of a roman pontifical university library, this work became the first 
shot in a war which developed over the natural desire to see god in St Thom-
as. As we will see, Feingold presents a radical critique of De Lubac’s theology 
of the supernatural. Such a critique did not sit well with many in the theolog-
ical academy, but least of all with the theologians associated with a developing 
school of theology in the English-speaking world called radical orthodoxy. 
This movement, which in many ways takes De Lubac as its inspiration, can be 
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described as being at the pole opposite Feingold on the supernatural question. 
The founder of the radical orthodoxy movement, John Milbank (b. 1952), 
Professor of religion, Politics and Ethics at the University of Nottingham 
in England, responded to Feingold’s 490 page tome with a 117 page booklet 
seeking to vindicate De Lubac2.
Both the initial provocation and the reaction have produced an entire 
body of articles, some of which will also be considered here3. one striking 
quality of this recent genre of theological literature –the revision of the theol-
ogy of the supernatural by way of the combat between Feingold and Milbank– 
is that, until now, all of its interlocutors have been part of the English speaking 
world. The original debate over De Lubac’s Surnaturel began with the French 
and later expanded to the world of the roman pontifical university system, 
only much later being noticed and taken up by the theological academy in 
other countries. This debate began with an American and an Englishman, and 
as of yet remains virtually contained within Anglophone academia4.
A second notable characteristic of this discussion is the religious perspec-
tive to which its participants belong. The debate over Surnaturel took place 
almost entirely among roman Catholics. only much later, was it noticed by 
non-roman Catholic Christians and, even then, mostly by way of observa-
tion, rather than participation.
The last salient feature of this debate is the state of life of its participants. 
In the original debate, Dominican and Jesuit clerics lined up on both sides of 
the debate, with secular clergy and priests from other religious communities 
to follow. In contrast, the vast majority of those who have entered the arena 
in this fight are lay theologians, and also include notable female theologians 
as well5.
These three characteristics alone reflect how the environment of theolog-
ical discussion has changed dramatically since 1946. The weight of theological 
discourse on the supernatural has shifted from Continental Europe to the 
Anglo-Saxon world, reflecting the greater visibility of English language and 
culture in the larger theological world. The opening of the study of theology 
in Catholic faculties worldwide to laymen and laywomen has brought a new 
demographic to the debate that was not there before, making the theology of 
the supernatural no longer an exclusively clerical discourse. The development 
of wider conversation in theology in an ecumenical context has also led to 
fruitful exchanges between roman Catholics and Christians of other ecclesial 
communities. If theology of the supernatural in 1946 was a Franco-roman 
CUADErNoS DoCTorALES DE LA FACULTAD DE TEoLogíA / voL. 61 / 2014 181
Surnaturel Revisited
Catholic clerical discussion, in 2010 it is an American-English Christians-of-
all-stripes lay one.
In this chapter we will examine the provocative thesis of Feingold, Mil-
bank’s reaction to it, as well as the observations of much of the critical liter-
ature written since. We will pay particular attention to the work of reinhard 
Hütter, who, in analyzing the debate between Feingold and Milbank, returns 
to the discussion of the desire for god as an intellectual one, opening the way 
for SCg III 25 to illuminate the discussion.
1. lawrence FeingOld
1.1. Feingold and the Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas
Feingold’s book is divided into sixteen chapters, a conclusion and a very useful 
biography, which lists works of St Thomas, as well as books and articles on 
the supernatural question from St Thomas’s time down to our own6. In his 
Introduction, Feingold states as his aim, «to examine exactly what St Thomas 
means when he speaks of a natural desire to see god, and how the debate over 
its interpretation bears on fundamental questions concerning the relation be-
tween nature and grace»7. He describes the same two schools of thought on 
the question that Borde discerned in his intervention at the Toulouse Collo-
quium. He then adds that «at stake is the distinction between the natural and 
supernatural orders, the corresponding distinction between natural and super-
natural beatitude, and the gratuitousness of heaven»8. Whereas other authors 
have been content to note that the question of natural desire is wrapped up in 
these other questions, it does not seem they put the gravity of their mutual in-
ter-relation as starkly as does Feingold. Yet for Feingold, after completing his 
intense historical and systematic study of these questions, the consequences 
for the incorrect interpretation of this question are weighty indeed.
Feingold discerns that the answers to four important questions are at 
play here. Before he lists those questions, however, he posits another question 
which can be seen as kind of an Ur-question the answer to which determines 
all other questions: is the natural desire for God elicited by some knowledge of God’s 
existence or completely unconditional and unrelated to knowledge? Feingold notes 
that natural desire is an analogical term. Feingold maintains that the natural 
desire for god in man has to be elicited because of the very structure of hu-
man nature. He writes that if an object is «pleasing to the senses, there will 
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follow a movement of the sense appetite; if the object is grasped as good by 
the intellect, there will follow a movement of the rational appetite, which is 
the will»9. The desire is elicited, in the sense that it is «’drawn out,’ as it were, 
by the desirability of the known object»10. The natural desire for Feingold, 
against De Lubac, is clearly elicited.
The first question then, becomes, Does this natural elicited desire correspond 
to an underlying innate appetite for the vision of God, a sign that will and intellect 
are ordered by their nature to the vision of God? Here Feingold notes the exeget-
ical problem of the interpretation of the two seemingly contradictory texts of 
St Thomas on this question, and the consequent formation of two schools of 
thought based on those variant interpretations.
The second question is, Is this natural desire conditional or absolute? Fein-
gold observes that St Thomas never directly confronted this question, and 
that the divergence of opinion as to its answer is based on an attempt to re-
construct how St Thomas might have answered the question based on other 
principles found in his work. He notes that the view of natural desire as con-
ditional comes from the sixteenth century theologians Medina, Báñez, Suárez, 
and John of St Thomas and was held almost universally by Thomists until De 
Lubac.
The third question is, Is the existence of a natural desire for God in St Thomas 
a strict proof of the possibility of the beatific vision, or is it just an argument of fittin-
gess? Feingold sees three alternative answers to this question. The first is that 
«the natural desire to see god provides only an argument of fittingness»11 for 
the possibility and the actual offer of the beatific vision, a thesis held by most 
Thomists from Báñez to garrigou-Lagrange. The second is that it demon-
strates the possibility, but only shows fittingness for the offer, a thesis held by 
De Broglie and Maréchal. The third, which is that of De Lubac and Jansen, is 
that it demonstrates both the possibility and the offer.
The answer to the third question thus raises the fourth question, How can 
an innate and absolute desire, which strictly demonstrates the possibility and the offer 
of the beatific vision, be reconciled with the fact that the beatific vision and grace are 
in no way due to the creature? Here Feingold raises the question of pure nature, 
and notes that De Lubac himself had to rework his 1946 thesis after Humani 
generis to account, at least in some way, for pure nature.
In outlining these four questions in this way, Feingold has constructed 
the flow chart of questions for whose existence we hoped in examining the 
manuals, histories and articles of theology in the Second Part of this thesis. He 
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succinctly outlines how the questions rise from each other and are inter-relat-
ed to their answers.
Feingold in his Introduction says very clearly from the outset, «I come 
to disagree in this work with the interpretation made famous by Henri de 
Lubac in his works Surnaturel» and Le Mystère du surnaturel12 Yet he seconds 
the intuition that led De Lubac to his famous work, namely, the attempt to 
address the pastoral problem that «contemporary man has lost the sense of 
the supernatural character of Christian promise and vocation»13. He also 
maintains that the theology of the supernatural is not the key to understand-
ing De Lubac’s work, as others have held. And he expresses profound admi-
ration for many of De Lubac’s other celebrated texts, such as his Catholicisme 
and Exégèse Medievale.
While insisting that De Lubac was wrong in his answers to the above 
four questions, Feingold nonetheless writes approvingly that De Lubac iden-
tified eight questions that are central to correctly understanding the super-
natural problem. 1) Does the rational creature have a natural potency to be 
elevated to the vision of god? 2) Is specific obediential potency an adequate 
category to characterize our openness to grace? 3) Has a supernatural finality, 
generating an innate and absolute natural desire for god, been imprinted on 
our nature prior to grace? 4) Does the fact that there is a natural desire for 
god mean that no other final end exists for man? 5) How can we reconcile the 
natural desire to see god with the gratuitousness of the supernatural? 6) Can 
the notion of what is due to nature help us distinguish between nature and the 
supernatural? 7) How can the object of an innate and conditional appetite not 
be due to nature? 8) How are grace and the theological virtues not due to a 
nature with an innate desire?
Although Feingold appears to claim that De Lubac rightly identified 
the questions and struggled to answer them, he also claims that De Lubac’s 
answers were wrong. Furthermore, he asserts that the «classical Thomistic 
school» De Lubac «so violently opposed has the elements of a solution that 
provides a fine balance between the natural desire for the vision of god and 
the distinction of the natural and supernatural orders»14. In other words, Fein-
gold sets himself the task of doing what virtually no one dared to do since 
Surnaturel, return to the status quo ante De Lubac, but in such a way as absolves 
that line of thought of the criticisms De Lubac attributed to it, the same ones 
that had been widely accepted in the theological academy since at least after 
the Second vatican Council.
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In this project, Feingold goes beyond those who, like Nicolas, maintain 
such a pre-De Lubac thesis while integrating much of the French Jesuit’s 
concerns over against those who have assented wholeheartedly to De Lubac’s 
thesis. This attempt, and the way which Feingold argues it, has caused a sig-
nificant debate in the English-speaking theological world.
Feingold begins his discussion of natural desire in St Thomas with the 
fact that appetite is an analogical reality. This is an interesting point of depar-
ture, because many theologians in their discussion of natural appetite have 
begun with the analogical reality of nature as opposed to that of appetite. 
Feingold commences with the principle of St Thomas that «every nature has 
an inclination or appetite toward its proper good, which is a participation of 
the divine goodness»15. Furthermore, each thing desires that good «according 
to its mode of being»16. Hence the appetite of man is a rational one, as opposed 
to the natural or sensitive appetite of non-living creatures and animals. As 
such, it is «aroused on the base of intellectual knowledge»17. Man’s appetite 
therefore follows upon rational or intellectual knowledge, which grasps the 
nature of the good, and is hence elicited by the good18.
Feingold notes that a faculty of the soul can desire in two ways: 1) as the 
object of the innate natural appetite, in which case the desire is present in po-
tency, an unconscious tendency of the potency towards its fulfillment. 2) insofar 
as it is known as good, hence elicited and conscious19. The will, then, has a natural 
desire for its end, but as goods present themselves to the intellect, that desire 
can be said to be elicited. This distinction leads Feingold to posit that, for St 
Thomas, there is a clear distinction between elicited and natural appetite, even 
if St Thomas does not formulate the distinction in those words. Inclination refers 
to the movement of the natural appetite, while natural desire «that is a movement 
or act of the will, aroused by prior knowledge» is an elicited desire20.
Elicited acts of the will are further subdivided into natural (voluntas ut 
natura) and free (voluntas ut ratio). Feingold gives an example: «it is naturally 
known that happiness, life and health are good, and thus they are naturally and 
spontaneously loved and desired... it is not naturally known that seeing a doc-
tor or taking medicine are the best means to health»21. The fact that we have a 
natural appetite as opposed to a rational appetite, and a rational appetite that 
is divided into natural and free, can be a source for confusion (or a pretext for 
conflation). Feingold points out that natural is not equated with innate, and 
natural applies both to the innate inclination of the will and to elicited acts of 
the will which naturally arise before knowledge22.
CUADErNoS DoCTorALES DE LA FACULTAD DE TEoLogíA / voL. 61 / 2014 185
Surnaturel Revisited
But what is naturally willed by man? Feingold responds: first, the good in 
general (such as happiness, the full possession of the good); second, all those 
things which are seen as necessary for the well-being of the person (ex: being, 
life, truth). This leads to another question: How is our will determined to will 
some things naturally and not freely? Feingold introduces St Thomas’ distinc-
tion between two modes by which the will is «necessitated»23. Some things 
naturally and irresistibly attract the will, such as happiness, whenever they 
are considered. But in this life, they are not always considered; we can choose 
not to consider them, and as a result, our will is not naturally and irresistibly 
attracted to them. Feingold posits that it is for this reason the Scholastic axiom 
developed: «the will is said to be necessitated with regard to specification, but not 
with regard to exercise»24. In other words, «secondary objects of natural desire 
necessarily attract the will, they do not necessitate choice»25.
Yet can this natural desire be willed conditionally? Here Feingold refers to St 
Thomas’s consideration of Jesus Christ’s prayer in the garden of gethsemane, 
«Not My will, but Yours be done», referring to god’s will that He suffer for 
the sins of the world26. Here St Thomas affirms that, Christ did will things not 
in conformity with the divine will, and discerns the natural human desire, the 
divine will, and the deliberate choice of His human will to follow the divine 
will contrary to natural desire. «Although overruled by His deliberated will, 
His natural desire was not eliminated by it»27. Feingold extrapolates from this 
dynamic within Christ in the garden of gethsemane a truth applicable to all 
men: «conditional willing of voluntas ut natura... is a willing secundum quid», 
namely, that the will moves towards what is desired as long as there is nothing 
to obstruct it. It is therefore an imperfect or conditional natural desire, what 
the Scholastics called velleitas28.
This lengthy but tightly reasoned analysis of the relationship between 
desire and nature leads Feingold to a conclusion: that for St Thomas, «natural 
desires, which are elicited acts of the will, are nevertheless implicitly condi-
tional or imperfect, except in the single case of the desire for happiness itself. 
This means that a natural desire to see god can be conditional, without ceas-
ing to be a truly natural desire»29. By this, Feingold establishes that a desire 
can be natural, elicited, and conditional all at the same time.
But is the desire for God natural, elicited, and conditional? Feingold 
maintains that St Thomas develops an idea of the desire for god as natural 
and elicited in the Summa Contra Gentiles, particularly in III, ch. 25, 50-1, a 
teaching which is repeated in the Compendium theologiae I, ch. 104. Feingold 
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bases five conclusions on these texts of St Thomas about the natural desire to 
see god. First, this desire is derived from the desire man has to know. Second, 
it is an elicited desire. Third, it is based on the principle that it is good for man 
to know the ultimate causes of things. Fourth, this desire is natural in the sense 
that the consideration of the existence of god leads man to know more about 
god. Fifth, even though St Thomas does not say whether the desire if condi-
tional or not, it is consistent with the rest of his teaching on natural desire to 
posit that it is conditional30.
Nonetheless, Feingold maintains that even this examination of the texts 
in St Thomas leaves us with five unresolved problems31. He lists them as fol-
lows. First, if, as St Thomas repeats, it is a revealed truth that the vision of god 
is an end too great for our will to desire, how can it be a truly natural desire? 
Second, if our supernatural end is above the power of natural reason to know, 
how can St Thomas then provide a demonstration that we even have a super-
natural end?32. Third, if our supernatural end is above what is due to nature, 
and distinct from our connatural end, how can the desire for it be natural? 
Fourth, if we naturally desire happiness in general, but do not naturally desire 
the beatific vision, then how can there be a natural desire for such a vision? 
Fifth, if the desire to see god is natural, how is that any different than the vir-
tue of hope, which is a theological virtue infused in the soul by god? Feingold 
notes that the texts of St Thomas leave us with these questions, which arose in 
the subsequent centuries of wrestling with these texts.
Feingold suggests that these questions arise in the mind of anyone who 
reads the texts of St Thomas. He writes, «The ability to resolve them will 
be the test of a valid interpretation»33. In the course of his work, he seeks to 
answer these questions, by tracing the theological enterprise to confront the 
multifaceted supernatural question in St Thomas’ commentators.
1.2. Feingold on Cajetan and the Development of a Thomistic Consensus
Feingold dedicates 101 pages to a close analysis of Cajetan’s commentar-
ies on St Thomas, as opposed to the three pages De Lubac dedicated to them 
in Surnaturel34. At the end of his section on Cajetan, he provides two sections 
entitled, «»Comparison of Cajetan, Scotus, De Lubac and St Thomas» and 
«Conclusion»35.
In his comparison of the three thinkers, Feingold makes some interesting 
observations. First of all, he declares that Scotus, Cajetan (in his first com-
CUADErNoS DoCTorALES DE LA FACULTAD DE TEoLogíA / voL. 61 / 2014 187
Surnaturel Revisited
mentary), and De Lubac agree, against St Thomas, «that the existence of the 
natural desire cannot be naturally known by man, and that it depends directly 
on the fact or the possibility of our being ordered to a supernatural end». He 
then notes that Cajetan and St Thomas agree, in opposition to Scotus and De 
Lubac, «that the desire is dependent on knowledge and is conscious, and that 
it cannot be conceived as an innate natural inclination or as a natural potency 
in the proper sense»36.
Feingold’s interpretation of Cajetan is important because he points out 
that Cajetan «corrected» one of his theses in a later work. In his commen-
tary on ST I q12 a1, Cajetan states that the natural desire for god «comes 
from the fact that god has actually destined us to see Him face to face and 
therefore has revealed to us certain supernatural facts which stem from Him 
not as Author of nature, but as Author of grace»37. In his later commentary 
on ST I-II q3 a8, he states that «the natural desire does not come from man’s 
[actual] elevation to a supernatural destiny (De Lubac), or from the possibility 
of such a perfection (Scotus), or from the revelation of supernatural effects of 
god [Cajetan in ST I q12 a1]»38. rather, having seen its effect, man, having 
an intellectual nature with a natural desire, wants to know the essence of the 
cause.
Feingold admits Cajetan’s erroneous interpretation of St Thomas on the 
natural desire in the first text, while pointing out its self-correction in the 
second text39. So why, then, did De Lubac and others so viciously attack Ca-
jetan on this point? Feingold suggests that, if one understands Cajetan from 
a view of natural potency and inclinations as St Thomas explains them, there 
are no grounds for criticizing Cajetan. What De Lubac and others have done, 
Feingold charges, is interpret Cajetan’s understanding of obediential potency 
according to the way Scotus accounted for potency and inclination40. In other 
words, Feingold seems to say that it is unfair to judge Cajetan for not being 
faithful to St Thomas on the natural desire for god by way of an understand-
ing of potency and inclination that is itself foreign to St Thomas and is instead 
the idea of Scotus, who contradicts St Thomas on the question of natural 
desire based on his idea of potency and inclination41.
When Cajetan denies a natural passive potency for the vision of god, he 
affirms that the vision of god, grace and the theological virtues are all intrin-
sically supernatural. He is not denying that the vision of god perfects human 
nature as such, but rather sustaining the fact that this supernatural perfection 
exceeds both our natural knowledge and inclination.
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We are hard-pressed to avoid the conclusion that, for Feingold, the idea 
that Cajetan has developed a «two-story» conception of nature and grace is 
patently false. Such a conception would indeed be wrong. As Feingold ex-
plains, «conceiving the order of grace as a second story obscures its transcendence 
by making it appear simply as a higher copy of the first floor... The two orders 
are related as earth to heaven... If we did not have a natural desire to see god, 
there would be no foundation in nature for its elevation to grace and glory»42. 
But, as Feingold demonstrates, Cajetan is not the architect of the two-story 
building.
De Lubac insisted that the post-Cajetanian development of the theology 
of the supernatural was a journey of increasing devolution within a system 
flawed from the beginning of its creation by Cajetan. Feingold, on the con-
trary, insists that the work of Medina, Báñez and Suárez, which resulted in the 
Thomistic consensus so widely accepted on the eve of Surnaturel and so vio-
lently attacked by it, is but a legitimate development of the same ideas present, 
not just in Cajetan, but in St Thomas himself. Feingold notes that for these 
latter commentators of St Thomas, «the axiom that a natural desire cannot be 
in vain is a principle which must be applied analogically, considering the par-
ticular type of natural desire that is involved»43. As a result, the natural desire 
to see god is imperfect and disproportionate, exceeding the limits of human 
nature. For this reason, these commentators cannot provide a demonstration 
of the possibility or the offer of the beatific vision by means of the natural 
desire for god, even if that same natural desire proves the perfection of the 
intellectual creature lies in god44.
Feingold further writes that St Thomas’ texts on natural desire for god 
«lead to the conclusion that this desire could only be taken away by removing 
our intellect and will»45. This consensus of theologians on the natural desire 
for god, as elaborated principally by Suárez upon St Thomas, Cajetan, Syl-
vester of Ferrara, Medina and Báñez, would last for three hundred years. It 
seems to be Feingold’s self-appointed goal in this thesis to return to it after the 
relatively shorter departure from it for the last sixty years.
1.3. Feingold’s Criticism of De Lubac
Feingold dedicates 100 pages to a close analysis of De Lubac, and an-
other 5046 to summarizing his conclusion that the corruptor of St Thomas 
is not Cajetan, but indeed De Lubac. Yet, throughout his text, Feingold has 
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examined his authors with a careful eye towards the challenge he mounts to 
De Lubac at the end.
Feingold begins with a clever observation, «De Lubac and Suárez agree 
that the possibility of a ‘state of pure nature’ is incompatible with an innate 
and unconditional natural desire to see god»47. They disagree in opting for 
two opposing alternatives. Here Feingold identifies the neuralgic point of the 
debate. ostensibly an argument over the interpretation of natural desire for 
god in St Thomas, lurking behind that was the question of the compatibility 
of pure nature with a desire conceived of as innate and unconditional. The 
Thomistic consensus was content to declare that the two were incompatible 
with each other. De Lubac claimed that they were incompatible because pure 
nature did not exist. once forced by Humani generis to admit the existence of 
pure nature, the burden of his constant clarification was placed on his demon-
stration of how pure nature could be compatible with innate and uncondition-
al natural desire for god.
We have seen earlier that De Lubac did not conceive of potency and 
inclination in the same way the Thomists did, but he still rejected the Thom-
ists’ conclusions (which were based on a Thomistic conception of potency 
and inclination) because they were inconsistent with what was really a Scotist 
conception of potency and inclination that could never admit of the Thom-
istic conclusions. In a similar bait-and-switch move, De Lubac accuses the 
Thomistic idea of pure nature as being a fabrication injurious to Christian 
civilization, when the De Lubacian idea of pure nature and the Thomistic idea 
of pure nature are entirely different. For De Lubac, pure nature was a state 
of purely natural happiness «in which man would be basically self-sufficient 
and closed into himself, not needing god’s aid for his beatitude»48 But such 
an idea of pure nature was not at all held by the Thomists. As De Lubac’s 
adversary Boyer defined it, pure nature is «a state in which man possesses all 
that which belongs to his definition, all that which is necessary for the exercise 
of his faculties, all that which is required for living reasonably and attaining 
a proportionate end»49 which Feingold adds, is «loving contemplation of God as 
grasped through His work of creation»50. De Lubac rejects the entire Thom-
istic consensus based on what amounts to a misapprehension of pure nature.
In his chapter 15, Feingold lists twelve ways in which De Lubac’s thesis 
is incompatible with St Thomas. We will attempt to summarize them here.
First, St Thomas and De Lubac «present two completely different models 
of how our nature is ordered and inclined to its supernatural end»51. For St 
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Thomas, nature is ordered intrinsically and inclines only to its connatural 
end; it is ordered and inclined to its supernatural end, not through itself, but 
through the super-added principles of grace and the virtues. For De Lubac, 
nothing needs to be super-added to nature to determine it to a supernatural 
end because it is already intrinsically finalized to that end.
Second, there is no basis in St Thomas for De Lubac to posit that the 
supernatural end of the creature generates a corresponding innate appetite or 
natural inclination prior to grace52.
Third, De Lubac contends that St Thomas uses the term desiderium nat-
urale to speak of a elicited and natural desire and desiderium naturae to speak of 
something deeper than desiderium naturale and not elicited. Feingold maintains 
that in the ten texts in which St Thomas employs the term desiderium naturae, 
his use of it is synonymous with his use of the term desiderium naturale. In fact, 
De Lubac is actually contrasting how Scotus uses the term desiderium naturae 
with how St Thomas uses the term desiderium naturale53.
Fourth, De Lubac is in agreement with St Thomas that actually existing 
nature does not have any supernatural element. De Lubac cannot reconcile 
this teaching with his assertion that the natural desire for god is the expres-
sion of a supernatural finality imprinted on our nature in creation itself, prior 
to grace and determining us to our supernatural end54.
Fifth, for St Thomas, intellectual nature is naturally open to being el-
evated to a supernatural end through grace. De Lubac, however, states that 
man is more than open, he is already intrinsically determined, finalized and 
called to a supernatural end through a supernatural finality imprinted on us, 
prior to grace55.
Sixth, De Lubac says that the natural desire for god is the most absolute 
of all desires, but that it is also not perfect or efficacious. Yet, for St Thomas, 
because the natural desire for god is a desire for knowledge of the essence of 
the first cause, it cannot be absolute and is hence conditional. This is why it is 
not perfect or efficacious56. Asserting that natural desire is absolute, De Lubac 
«is attributing to it elements proper both to the theological virtues... and to 
the natural desire for happiness in general». Feingold charges in doing so, that 
De Lubac confuses the natural desire for happiness generated by the will and 
that sufficient inclination for our supernatural end generated by grace, two 
things St Thomas distinguished clearly between57.
Seventh, De Lubac, along with Scotus, believes that the existence of nat-
ural desire cannot be reached by natural reason without revelation, in contrast 
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to St Thomas, for whom the structure of our capacity to know leads to the 
affirmation that we naturally desire the knowledge of first causes58.
Eighth, De Lubac affirms that the natural desire to see god demon-
strates the actual offer of the beatific vision, based on the axiom that natural 
desire cannot be in vain. St Thomas, however, uses the axiom analogically, and 
concludes that it demonstrates the incorruptibility of the soul, that human life 
has an end beyond this life, the fittingness of the resurrection, why the natu-
ral desire to escape death may be frustrated in man, and the possibility of the 
vision of god59.
Ninth, in Surnaturel, something can be due to a creature’s nature in vir-
tue of a natural inclination implanted in the creature and still not make god 
dependent on the creature. Yet, if it is due in this way, it cannot be said to be 
gratuitous60. In Mystère du surnaturel, Feingold claims, De Lubac transfers the 
problem of gratuitousness by saying that pure nature shows only the gratu-
itousness of grace with respect to «another humanity» that has not received 
a supernatural finality, while it remains to be shown in regard to concretely 
existing historical man. For Feingold, this seems to avoid the fact that only 
pure nature can show that gratuitousness61.
Tenth, De Lubac proposes that the supernatural is gratuitous because it 
is supernatural, and is given as gift. But for Feingold, «the gratuitousness of 
the gift of grace and glory does not come solely from the divine or personal 
aspect of the gift, considered in itself, but from its relation to the recipient, to 
whom it is not due»62.
Eleventh, De Lubac assumes that «god’s intention to elevate us to a 
supernatural end essentially determines the constitution of our nature», thus 
making pure nature irrelevant to the gratuitousness of our supernatural end. 
Feingold rejects this assumption for two reasons: one, because «St Thomas 
shows the existence of a natural desire to see god in every intellectual creature, 
independently of the fact of its actually being destined to a supernatural end» 
as a «direct consequence of the natural desire to know causes and essences». 
Two, for St Thomas, man is intrinsically ordered to his supernatural end only 
through the super-added principles of grace and the theological virtues. In 
other words, «it is not the nature as such which has been changed by the fact 
of elevation, so that the nature itself –having received a supernatural finality– 
now orders us to the vision of god»63.
Twelfth, De Lubac’s contention that the Thomistic distinction between 
nature and the supernatural led to naturalism and atheism is not tenable for 
Christopher smith
192 CUADErNoS DoCTorALES DE LA FACULTAD DE TEoLogíA / voL. 61 / 2014
four reasons. one, the Thomists argue that, in any hypothesis, man’s final 
happiness can only lie in god. Two, Modern naturalism and atheism can be 
demonstrated to arise from the Enlightenment, when Thomism was eclipsed 
by it. Third, the distinction between a natural and a supernatural end is nec-
essary to correctly distinguish the two orders and avoid the construction of 
a monistic one natural-supernatural order. Fourth, atheism rejects not only 
the supernatural end of man, god, but also the connatural end of man, god 
contemplated through creation64.
For all of these reasons, Feingold challenges, not only De Lubac’s theol-
ogy of the supernatural as a whole, but the entire argument that post-Cajeta-
nian Thomism was a decadent Scholasticism unworthy of theology. on the 
contrary, Feingold maintains that post-Cajetanian Thomism to be a legiti-
mate development of St Thomas. As he explains,
The development of Thomism in the period from 1500 to 1900 is all too 
often imagined today principally as a corruption of doctrine, in which Cajetan 
and Suárez are the principal villains, subverting the teaching of St Thomas –in-
cluding his doctrine on the natural desire to see god– and closing man in on 
himself. In this work, I have tried to show that the Thomistic tradition in this 
period manifests a gradual development of doctrine with regard to this ques-
tion, as theologians such as Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Suárez, followed 
by many others, responded fruitfully to the challenges posed by Scotus, de 
Soto, Baius and Jansenius. Those challenges spurred Thomists to give greater 
nuance and development to the thesis of St Thomas65.
Feingold is not content, however, to argue that post-Cajetanian Thom-
ism is a legitimate development of the thought of St Thomas. He accuses 
the critics of that Thomism for being «seriously detrimental to the cause of 
theology and the life of the Church» because they have introduced «a violent 
rupture rather than organic growth» into Catholic theology, which «must be 
the householder of the gospel ‘who brings out of his treasure what is new and 
what is old’»66. He likens the development of post-Cajetanian Thomism to the 
homogenous development of doctrine described by Blessed John Henry New-
man in his book, Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. In contrast, the 
detractors from this development seem to be inferred to be akin to terrorists 
who have upset the pax theologica with ultimately incorrect ideas.
Feingold ends his thesis with five reasons why we should accept the pre-
De Lubacian Thomistic theology of the supernatural. First, the rejection of 
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an innate appetite for the vision of god shows the gratuitousness of the super-
natural which god grants to man surpassing his nature. Second, «the inter-
pretation of the natural desire to see god as an elicited natural desire rather 
than the innate tendency of nature itself better manifests the transcendence of 
god». Third, the fact that man is intrinsically ordered to god not by nature 
but by grace «better manifests the humility of the spiritual creature» to whom 
nothing is due. Fourth, «the exclusion of an innate inclination for the beatific 
vision better manifests the necessity of the sacraments and the supernatural 
virtue of charity». The desire for the beatific vision comes from the grace 
of Baptism and not from something already within man. Fifth, De Lubac’s 
view «debases heaven by naturalizing it». restoring the proper balance in the 
teaching of the natural desire for god can cause man to «discover ever again 
a radical wonder at the inconceivable dimension of» the supernatural life67.
1.4. Some Further Thoughts on Feingold
Before we go on to examine Milbank’s response to Feingold, it might be 
helpful here to pause to consider some of Feingold’s criticism. Is it possible 
that Feingold is complicating the question unnecessarily? For St Thomas, all 
things desire the good, and in doing so, implicitly desire god. This same 
dynamic obtains for man, with the exception that man has a capacity for all 
the good, at least in its infinite openness to all good. In this optic, voluntas ut 
natura is the general inclination of the will to the good, which manifests itself 
in the first concrete inclination towards that which appears as the good, and is 
also behind the decision of reason to obtain that good.
The desire for god is nothing else than the inclination of intellect, which 
by its very nature desires to know, and god is the only object that justifies and 
fills this desire. It is not a desire for god because god has presented himself 
to consciousness, but because it is just the desire to know, which in man is the 
desire to know all, which can be finalized only in god. For this reason, the 
question of whether the desire for god is elicit or unconditional is irrelevant. 
For St Thomas interprets the desire to know and to know all as the desire of 
nature for god. It is parallel to the question of good. Whatever man desires as 
good, is a desire for god, the summum bonum.
Feingold’s evaluation of De Lubac’s negative legacy to theology might 
also be profitably challenged. Is the twilight of Thomism really due to De 
Lubac’s deleterious effect on theology? While it is certainly worthwhile to 
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suggest that there might be more to post-Cajetanian Thomism than many lat-
ter twentieth-century theologians gave it credit for, is it also not possible that 
Thomism around the turn of the century had already exhausted itself because 
of its refusal to integrate the insights of the biblical and liturgical movements 
into its thought?
2. JOhn milbank
2.1. A Brief Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy
The desire of theologians to help man rediscover awe and wonder motivated 
De Lubac and Feingold to meditate on the relationship between nature and 
the supernatural in man. They of course are not the only thinkers to con-
sider the problem with this goal in mind. While Feingold was pursuing his 
philosophical and theological studies in rome which would culminate in his 
controversial thesis arguing for the jettisoning of De Lubac’s theology of the 
supernatural, a movement was afoot to carry out De Lubac’s intuitions on 
the supernatural to their logical extremes. Three professors of theology at 
the University of Cambridge in England were developing what has come to 
be known as the new theological school of radical orthodoxy. John Milbank 
(b. 1952), Catherine Pickstock and graham Ward (b. 1955), are all Anglican 
theologians who, like Feingold, seek to present the truth of the Christian faith 
in the post-modern world68.
originally, radical orthodoxy was called Postmodern Critical Augustini-
anism and is held to have its remote origin in John Milbank’s 1990 book Theol-
ogy and Social Theory69. Looking for a catchier title, the three Cambridge dons 
settled for the term radical orthodoxy for the collection of essays which was 
to be the Magna Carta of the movement70. In the Introduction to this collec-
tion, the editors describe how this movement is both orthodox and radical.
orthodox in the most straightforward sense of commitment to creedal 
Christianity and the exemplarity of its Christian matrix. But orthodox also in 
the more specific sense of re-affirming a richer and more coherent Christianity 
which was gradually lost sight of in the Middle Ages...
radical, first of all, in a sense of a return to patristic and medieval roots, 
and especially to the Augustinian vision of all knowledge as divine illumination 
–a notion which transcends the modern bastard dualisms of faith and reason, 
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nature and grace–. radical, second, in the sense of seeking to deploy this re-
covered vision systematically to criticize modern society, culture, politics, art, 
science and philosophy with an unprecedented boldness. But radical in yet a 
third sense of realizing that via such engagements we do have to also rethink 
the tradition71.
radical orthodoxy sees itself very much as the continuation of the nou-
velle théologie, which arguably might have set the same tasks for itself as Mil-
bank sets for radical orthodoxy. Its critique of modernity and post-modernity 
faults the post-Cajetanian Thomist tradition for the fabrication of the sepa-
ration of natural and supernatural. But radical orthodoxy seeks to push the 
critique of the nouvelle théologie even further, «in recovering and extending a 
fully Christianized ontology and practical philosophy consonant with authen-
tic Christian doctrine»72.
While the three main originators of radical orthodoxy are associated 
with the High Church Anglo-Catholic wing of the Church of England, the 
contributors to the seminal volume also includes other Anglicans as well as 
roman Catholics. Eight of the twelve are British. The others are Americans. 
All of them are associated with Cambridge University as professors, students 
or devotees. This trans-denominational and Anglo-American project may 
have its inspiration in De Lubac and his fellow theologians associated with 
the nouvelle théologie. Its adherents, however, are quick to point out that they 
do not subscribe to what is generally held as the theology of Thomism, Tran-
scendental Thomism, ressourcement, neo-Patristics, or Communio. Where it 
differs from all of these other movements in theology is its attitude towards 
post-modernism. Even while mounting a vicious critique of post-modernism, 
radical orthodoxy «seeks to retrieve the deep theological resources of the 
Christian tradition –particularly pre-modern resources in the fathers and me-
dievals– to let them speak to postmodernism»73. Hence it very clearly dialogues 
in a serious fashion with the analytical philosophical tradition whose hegem-
ony is unquestioned in Anglo-American academia, as well as the post-modern 
linguistic philosophies of those such as Michel Foucault.
Not unlike the nouvelle théologie, radical orthodoxy has raised much dis-
cussion in the theological arena, even though its influence is mostly felt in 
Anglican Anglo-American circles. Yet unlike the nouvelle théologie, radical or-
thodoxy has not found itself embroiled in controversy with the Magisterium 
of the roman Catholic Church. However, even though there are some nota-
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ble roman Catholic theologians associated with radical orthodoxy, their par-
ticipation tends to be more nuanced and less enthusiastic than their Anglican 
confreres. An example is Laurence Paul Hemming, Senior research Fellow in 
the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of 
Lancaster University and a roman Catholic deacon. He contributed an essay 
on nihilism entitled, «Heidegger and the grounds of redemption» to the 
initial volume of radical orthodoxy74. In the year 2000, however, he edited a 
volume entitled, Radical Orthodoxy? – A Catholic Enquiry, in which the radical 
orthodox theologians and others reflected on the concerns roman Catholics 
have with the school75.
In this volume, Hemming notes how roman Catholics and Anglicans 
can write of the same things in radical orthodoxy but from a very differ-
ent perspective. «When Catholics write of transubstantiation, or the dogma 
of the Assumption of the Mother of god, or the understanding of sacrifice 
implied in the Mass, we speak to, within the ecclesia, or the assembly, where 
these things are specifically taken to be true. When non-Catholics speak of 
these things, they do so in ecclesial contexts which do not receive these doc-
trines in the same way»76. This observation will be very important as radical 
orthodoxy considers certain documents of the Magisterium which have a di-
rect bearing on the supernatural question, for example, Humani generis. An 
authentically roman Catholic theologian must take this papal encyclical into 
account in his theology in a way very differently than how an Anglican can 
approach it77. Another example of how roman Catholic approaches to theol-
ogy differ from that of others is over the role of St Thomas. Milbank criticizes 
some of his roman Catholic colleagues for believing it necessary «to revert to 
the view that what Aquinas thinks is necessarily decisive»78.
The nuanced position that roman Catholic theologians have with re-
spect to radical orthodoxy can be brought out via Milbank’s reflection on 
how radical orthodoxy, while perpetuating the nouvelle théologie, is not to be 
identified with it. He notes, first of all, that radical orthodoxy is not roman 
Catholic, but can be espoused by both Catholics and Protestants79. Second, 
Milbank asserts that «roman Catholic theology actually finds it hugely diffi-
cult to come to terms with De Lubac’s legacy», faulting liberals and conserv-
atives for impeding such a coming to terms. Third, Milbank baldly attests, 
«roman Catholicism can be seen... as profoundly colluding with a modernity 
it helped to construct»80. As Fergus Kerr observes, «aligning Radical Ortho-
doxy with the nouvelle théologie is already to invite more than one Catholic 
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response –to invite, perhaps, incommensurable responses–»81. He cites both 
Transcendental Thomism and «the continuators of post-Cajetanian Thom-
ism» as united «to repudiate the project of a ‘fully Christianised ontology’»82. 
Kerr also observes that Catholics sympathetic to radical orthodoxy will find 
themselves inevitably at odds with what has become the two opposing schools 
of thought in which most contemporary Catholic theologians identify them-
selves –Communio versus Concilium–83.
Within this complex matrix of contemporary Catholic theology, perhaps 
the most polarized views would be, not that of Communio and Concilium, both 
of which are outgrowths of the nouvelle théologie and have the correct inter-
pretation of the Second vatican Council as the principal working strategy of 
their theology, but rather that of Radical Orthodoxy and what has questionably 
been called the Neo-Cajetanism of Feingold. For if radical orthodoxy repre-
sents the nouvelle théologie carried to its ultimate extreme by way of a recov-
ery of pre-modern sources in attempt to critically engage post-Modernism, 
Feingold can be said to represent its opposite: the very theology the nouvelle 
théologie sought to eradicate by way of a recovery of modern sources seen in 
continuation of the pre-modern ones without the slightest attempt to engage 
post-Modernism. Needless to say, it was perhaps inevitable that Feingold’s 
thesis would provoke a response from radical orthodoxy, as both the Concil-
ium and Communio crowds watched on, unsure as how to respond in turn, or 
if to respond at all.
2.2. Milbank’s Account of the Supernatural in De Lubac
Milbank intuits that De Lubac in his elaboration of the theology of the 
supernatural is actually doing something which goes far beyond the questions 
of pure nature and natural desire. For Milbank, De Lubac «implicitly pro-
posed a new sort of ontology –indeed, in a sense a ‘non-ontology’– articulated 
between the discourses of philosophy and theology, fracturing their respective 
autonomies, but tying them loosely and yet firmly together»84. By this non-on-
tology, De Lubac could explain the relationship between «the pure immanent 
being proper to philosophy» and «the revelatory event proper to theology»85. 
Milbank then goes on to say that this new ontological discourse (which he 
has just claimed to be non-ontology) concerns the «paradoxical definition of 
human nature as intrinsically raised above itself to the ‘super-nature’ of di-
vinity»86. Here Milbank notes the correlation between how De Lubac views 
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the relation between philosophy and theology and how he sees nature and the 
supernatural.
Milbank draws out the radical implications of this discourse. For him, it 
deconstructs the possibility of dogmatic theology as it had been understood 
up until De Lubac, as well as any independent conception of philosophy. 
«Philosophy then appears to require the transcendent supplement of theolo-
gy, yet theology equally requires the (consequently non-available) foundation 
of philosophy»87. This assertion is built upon von Balthasar’s analysis of De 
Lubac’s discourse as a «suspended middle»88.
However, whereas for Thomists this suspended middle degenerates into 
unsolvable aporia, Milbank welcomes it as a necessary revolution, because he 
maintains it allows De Lubac to attempt, by way of the exercise of historical 
theology in Surnaturel, a restoration of the pre-modern Augustinian thought 
Milbank holds to be essential to radical orthodoxy.
Yet, if De Lubac is attempting a recovery of an ostensibly Augustinian 
framework in which to discuss nature and the supernatural, philosophy and 
theology, then why does he focus so much on St Thomas? In reality, Milbank 
observes, «the paucity of De Lubac’s treatment of Aquinas on the supernat-
ural and on grace seems surprising», and is in fact the lacuna «exploited by 
his neo-scholastic critics»89. Milbank opines that the reason De Lubac was 
insistent on recruiting St Thomas for his system was that he represents «the 
possibility of an East-West synthesis (Augustine plus the Dionysius/Dama-
scene legacy) and even more crucially that the attempt to incorporate Aristotle 
was positive»90.
But De Lubac’s interpretation of St Thomas did not convince his critics, 
who, Milbank writes, alternately accused him of «naturalizing the supernat-
ural» and «evacuating the natural sphere in favor of the rule of grace»91. In 
fact, it did not seem clear how De Lubac could avoid either extreme with his 
work. In order to avoid the one extreme, De Lubac in Le Mystère du surnaturel 
argues that the natural desire for god does not anticipate grace92. In turn, this 
«non-anticipation» is inconsistent with an absolute natural desire for beati-
tude. «In deference to Humani generis», Milbank informs us, De Lubac «drops 
from his re-worked ‘The Mystery of the Supernatural’ article the idea that 
there is a positive advance manifestation of the supernatural that ‘gives the 
natural desire for the supernatural’»93. Milbank observes that, in doing so, «de 
Lubac’s concessions to the Church hierarchy here seem to shift him more to 
a Scotist (and even latently Jansenist) exposition of his theory –which makes 
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the natural desire for the supernatural not any longer participatory, but only 
vaguely aspirational–»94.
This shift in explanation upon Magisterial intervention is for Milbank 
consequential. From one point of view, De Lubac does not really abandon 
his earlier position. As Milbank explains, «To sustain his ‘suspended middle’ 
de Lubac... strives rather to say that while Creation is the gift of independ-
ent existence and grace is the irresistible gift of nonetheless free and deified 
existence... then the natural desire of the supernatural is the gift of the bond 
between the two», a link which is both divine and human95. Yet from another 
point of view, it seems clear that Humani generis, because it «did entertain the 
notion of identifiable pure nature»96 is at odds with De Lubac’s contention, 
both in the article and the book entitled Le Mystère du surnaturel, that pure 
nature cannot guarantee the gratuity of grace.
Milbank considers De Lubac’s treatment of pure nature and how grace is 
related to nature the «subtle heart of De Lubac’s theology»97. For De Lubac, 
«pure nature in fact ruins the articulation of divine gratuity» because «the 
gift of deification is guaranteed by no contrast». In fact, in the beatific vision, 
«our entire being is transfigured by the divine light. Here we become the re-
ception of this light and there is no longer any additional ‘natural’ recipient 
of this reception. But this ensures, and does not destroy gratuity»98. Milbank 
is convinced that De Lubac escapes the thorny problem of how to assure gra-
tuity without recourse to pure nature by recalling that the illumination of the 
beatific vision transfigures those who possess it99.
Yet, De Lubac does not escape entirely from avoiding lacunae in his 
thought, particularly after his reworking of his thesis after Humani generis. In 
fact they were «partly shaped by his battles with authority» when he evinced 
a «formal capitulation to papal authority»100. Milbank lists several questions 
that «continued to haunt De Lubac»: 1) If natural desire is already the work-
ing of grace, why is it a natural desire? 2) If it is not already grace at work, is 
there not an exigency for grace on the part of human nature? 3) If the cosmos 
returns to god through spirits, did god have to create spirits? 4) Is it inevita-
ble that spirits are oriented to god if intellect is continuous with the animal 
soul, as per Aristotle? 5) If the orientation to grace is the mode taken by creat-
edness in intellectual creatures, how is the datum optimum of creation distinct 
from the donum perfectum of grace?
Milbank gives an account of De Lubac which encapsulates the French 
Jesuit’s thought all the while highlighting the themes most important for rad-
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ical orthodoxy, such as the intimate union between nature and grace, the re-
lation between philosophy and theology, and the role of divine illumination 
in knowledge. But he also accounts for the fact that De Lubac’s work, particu-
larly after his struggles with ecclesiastical superiors, admits of several lacunae 
and further questions with which he would continue to wrestle. It is an obser-
vation that Feingold would also make. For Feingold, those lacunae and ques-
tions arise from a double fundamental incoherence, within De Lubac’s own 
system on the one hand and in comparison with the theological tradition of 
St Thomas and his commentators on the other. For Milbank, they arise from 
the fact that De Lubac was essentially too timid to take to his reasoning to its 
logical end, for fear of Church authority. He stopped short, and that is why he 
seems so maddeningly incomprehensible to some.
For Feingold, De Lubac’s legacy to theology on the supernatural ques-
tion is terribly ambivalent. For Milbank, on the other hand, that legacy, par-
ticularly as it can be advanced and furthered by radical orthodoxy without 
the fear of ecclesiastical repression, constitutes the great hope for theology. 
Milbank writes, «contemporary Catholic theology, if it is to avoid both a lib-
eralism and a conservatism that are predicated on the idea of an autonomous 
pure nature, needs to recover the authentic and more radical account of the 
natural desire for the supernatural as offered by De Lubac»101. Since for Fein-
gold, De Lubac’s thesis on natural desire has proved disastrous for theology, it 
is unsurprising that Milbank, a self-appointed vanguard for De Lubac, would 
attack.
2.3. Milbank’s Criticism of Feingold
Nowhere in The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning 
the Supernatural does Milbank indicate that he wrote the book as a response to 
Feingold’s critique of De Lubac. But it is clear from the beginning that he has 
Feingold in mind. He introduces his brief but dense work with four quotes. 
The second quote is from a letter of De Lubac to Blondel in which the Jesuit 
asks, «How can a conscious spirit be anything other than an absolute desire 
for god?»102 Curiously enough, his accompanying bibliographical reference 
notes that this quotation is cited by Feingold in the first edition of his work. 
Two observations should be made. First, in choosing to reference Feingold 
and not the original source, Milbank acknowledges at least in part his Ameri-
can colleague’s scholarship, but it is unclear why he makes a point of citing it 
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via Feingold and not on its own. Second, from this very first instance all the 
way through his book, Milbank refers to Feingold as Feinberg. This consistent 
error, present wherever Milbank criticizes Feingold, may point to a certain 
cursory reading of Feingold.
That Milbank is hardly enamored of Feingold’s presentation of the su-
pernatural question is evident from a three page long footnote in which he 
first deals with Feingold103. He charges that Feingold selectively quotes from 
SCg III q25. Feingold omits the words, «An intellectual substance tends to 
divine knowledge as an ultimate end», from paragraph 2 of that question, as 
well as St Thomas’ contention, as expressed by Milbank, «were the telos of the 
beatific vision not the end of spiritual creatures, they would have a ‘less noble 
end’ than non-spiritual creatures who would still be united to god after their 
own fashion». For Milbank, this quotation proves that De Lubac was right 
to assert that, «given his justice, god could not have created purely natural 
spirit». Milbank charges that, because Feingold begins only with paragraphs 
11 and 12 in his treatment of the question, he omits the ontological context in 
which St Thomas speaks of natural desire to highlight human desire to know 
the causes of effects, which is part of Feingold’s argument that natural desire 
is an elicited desire104.
Milbank lists other apparent omissions as well. He charges that Fein-
gold, citing ST I Q 12 a1, omits the words, «for the ultimate perfection of 
the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being, 
since a thing is perfect in so far as it attains to its principle»105. He also notes 
that Feingold quotes ST I-II q 3 a8, «which provides less of the ontological 
background for the natural desire to see god» because he sees it as «’the most 
complete’ treatment, presumably on the grounds that it gives a longer version 
of the epistemological aspect that he is more comfortable with»106.
Milbank claims that Feingold has written his «arch-reactionary book» 
in order to «reinstate a garrigou-Lagrange type position». In order to do 
so, Feingold presumably omits what is not applicable to his thesis. Thus 
Feingold’s «selectivity gives the lie to the appearance of scholarly bulk and 
solidity which the weight of this tome seems to promise». Not only that, 
«[i]ts exegetical method is much like that of the proof-texting of a Protes-
tant fundamentalist»107. Within this critique of Feingold’s selectivity, Mil-
bank acknowledges what for him is the central point of dispute. For him, in 
St Thomas knowing and desiring «keep pace with each other», while «for 
Feinberg [sic] and the neo-Thomist view, there is first abstract intellectual 
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curiosity (without desire) and then an elicited desiring (without any degree 
of knowledge)»108.
In chapter seven of his book, Milbank places his criticism of Feingold 
within the context of his consideration of what he calls the new Freibourg-Tou-
louse school of Thomism. For him, this school «modified its traditional 
neo-Thomism to accommodate certain nouvelle théologie perspectives»109. But 
this school still, according to Milbank, continues to make four criticisms of De 
Lubac. First, they claim that De Lubac’s thesis was essentially Scotist. Milbank 
responds that in fact, Scotus had already made grace extrinsic by asserting 
that grace does not «involve deification, which is an intrinsic raising of our 
finite nature»110. For Milbank, «De Lubac’s thesis is far more Thomist than 
Scotist»111. Second, the fact that St Thomas believed in limbo, «the thorny 
problem of the souls in limbo who enjoy a purely natural beatitude», presents 
a challenge to De Lubac’s interpretation that there is no such thing as a purely 
natural beatitude112. Third, although St Thomas does speak of a natural love 
for god, «we share this love even with non-sentient beings». For De Lubac 
however, «this was not a fully free and personal love, but rather that sponta-
neous animal affection which for Aquinas (here very Aristotelian) is nonethe-
less exercised by us at a more conscious intellectual and voluntary level»113. 
Fourth, these Thomists hold that it is important to note that St Thomas does 
not speak of natura pura, but pura naturalia. As Torrell argued at the Toulouse 
Colloquium, «natura integra before the Fall refers in Aquinas to the non-im-
pairment of the pura naturalia and not to the entire intact natural/supernatural 
ordering»114.
While Milbank neither affirms or denies the validity of these criticisms 
of the «Freibourg-Toulouse» school, except for its assertion that De Lubac’s 
thesis is essentially Scotist, he does indicate that some within the school115 do 
have a definite position on the supernatural question. Milbank maintains that 
they are not ready «to allow an innate natural desire for the supernatural but 
only a variant of the Cajetanian potentia obedientialis»116.
Milbank also makes a useful observation about the difference between 
this «modified» «Freibourg-Toulouse» Thomist position and that of what 
he calls the «paleolithic» one of garrigou-Lagrange. For both versions of 
Thomism, «there can be no rational demonstration of the arrival of grace on 
the basis of natural desire for the supernatural»117. In fact, the natural desire 
for the supernatural only points «in a remotely probable way to the actuali-
ty of the gift of grace»118. However, the Freibourg-Toulouse school presents 
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that probability as an «ontological fittingness» in which «there is some sort of 
actual anticipation of the supernatural end in the structures of human nature 
that exceeds a mere formally latent possibility»119. As Milbank notes, this nu-
anced adjustment of the earlier Thomist position is possible due to Torell and 
Narcisse’s discussion of convenientia in St Thomas as an «aesthetic» term that 
indicates an ontological, and not just an epistemological, fittingness of human 
nature to receive the supernatural120.
But can there be a point of contact between the Freibourg-Toulouse 
school and De Lubac on the theology of the supernatural? For Milbank, it 
consists in the following. «Insofar as the fittingness (convenientia) of human 
nature «for supernatural elevation intrinsically participates in the divine wis-
dom, then... human nature must also be teleogically drawn towards the escha-
ton of beatitude that, nonetheless, it cannot elicit»121. But if convenientia is seen 
as just «the way an already replete human nature can appropriately lend itself 
to a further end and purpose added on to it by god»122 the point of contact 
between De Lubac and Freibourg-Toulouse is weak indeed.
Milbank places his finger on the possibility of a reconciliation or of fur-
ther divergence between both views. That the desire for god in human na-
ture is a natural one is now taken for granted, even by the newer Thomistic 
school, and this change in position is the fruit of a lengthy and convoluted 
dialogue with De Lubac over decades. Whether it is natural in the sense that 
De Lubac held it to be so (an élan of the spirit) or as Cajetan did (an elicited, 
imperfect, and conditional desire) still divides theologians. But even in that 
division between two schools of thought, there is a point of contact: in human 
nature there is a convenientia for supernatural elevation. But in what does that 
convenientia consist? How one views the concept of convenientia in general, 
and then as applied to the relation between nature and the supernatural, will 
modify to what extent one can consider a synthesis of the two schools of 
thought. Milbank has highlighted the relevance of convenientia to this discus-
sion, and it is undoubtedly the way forward in unpacking the supernatural 
problem. But much more study is in order to precisely establish a mutually 
agreeable conception of convenientia before it can be applied to the question. 
If not, then we will be in the same situation as with nature and desire: their 
true meaning obfuscated by univocal readings of texts or attempts to strait-
jacket one or another definition of the term in a system which presupposes 
another definition123.
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The issue of convenientia aside, it is clear that Milbank does not attempt 
an exhaustive critique of Feingold or of the Freibourg-Toulouse school of 
Thomism. Milbank’s attitude towards the former is much less appreciative 
than of the latter. It is clear that his brief confrontation with Feingold and the 
authors of the Toulouse Colloquium has not diminished his enthusiasm for 
De Lubac. He argues that De Lubac’s thesis should be extended to its extreme 
consequences. Such a «radicalization» as he calls it, is for him entirely consist-
ent with the Thomistic and Patristic tradition.
What does this radicalization look like? Milbank gives us a glimpse. 
First, he claims that because St Thomas «presents the natural desire for the 
supernatural in the context of the general drive of all creatures towards the 
maximum possible unity with god», then it follows that, contrary to Huma-
ni generis, «there is no spiritual existence without grace»124. Second, because 
Providence is involved in the governance of spiritual creatures, then there is 
something about spirit which is not merely natural. In fact, «the providential 
mode of dealing with spiritual creatures ultimately includes grace»125. Third, 
St Thomas does not envisage a cosmos without intellect. Therefore, if «cos-
mos requires the government of the spirit» and «spirit is destined to be en-
graced» then «every creature is already by and for grace»126. Fourth, if for St 
Thomas, «we are not by our nature turned to our last end», the freedom god 
has given us allows us to «reach this end of our own accord (at one level)»127. 
Just as Aristotle said, «For what we do by means of our friends, is done in 
a sense, by ourselves»128, the friend of grace allows us to accomplish all that 
grace invites our freedom to choose. In this sense, perhaps it is not far off the 
mark to say, that for Milbank, even more so than for De Lubac, and in contrast 
to Thomists from Cajetan to Feingold, «Tout est grâce»129. 
3. reactiOnS tO FeingOld vS. milbank
Milbank’s brief and concise elucidation of De Lubac’s thought on the super-
natural, as well as the possibilities for its radicalization, was brought about in 
part in reaction to Feingold. others in the theological academic community 
noticed Milbank’s response to Feingold, and gave both Milbank and Feingold 
attention. Because both of their positions, which might be summarized as De 
Lubac radicalized and Cajetan recovered were seen as ex-centric to the more 
familiar nouvelle théologie and Thomist interpretations, they aroused heated 
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debate. If Milbank’s spirited response to Feingold can be accurately classified 
as an outbreak of rabies theologica, it can be proposed that the debate which has 
ensued ever since, and which is ongoing, is comparable to the vehemence with 
which De Lubac’s thesis was debated in the years after Surnaturel. Here we 
will consider just a few samples of those reactions.
3.1. Oakes
oakes begins his response to Milbank by placing the supernatural problem-
atic within the context of one of the most controversial issues in contemporary 
theology: the pluralist theology of religions. How one views the nature/super-
natural dialectic at one and the same time determines and is determined by how 
one views the theology of religions. He writes, «If all men are naturally religious 
(even when they are avowed secularists and atheists), and if all religions (and 
ideologies) give equal access to the transcendent, then this must imply that there 
is a more or less seamless transition from (man’s) nature to (god’s grace)»130. But 
in the case of a religion, such as Christianity, which «raises a truth claim... over 
against the truth claims of all the other religions» then «grace is somehow radi-
cally distinct from man’s religious nature, without which grace man will wander 
in darkness until he encounters the true grace of the one true religion»131.
The question of the relationship between nature and grace cannot be 
seen independently of the relationship between man and the Church. oakes 
holds that De Lubac «altered the terms of this debate» for Catholics, which 
is why Milbank’s study of De Lubac’s theology of grace «is particularly wel-
come»132. oakes summarizes Milbank’s central thesis by way of a quotation 
from The Suspended Middle: «If creation implies both autonomous being and 
entirely heteronomous gift, while grace implies a raising of oneself as oneself 
to the beyond oneself, then the natural desire of the supernatural implies the 
dynamic link between the two orders that constitutes spirit, such that this link 
is entirely an aspect of the Creation and entirely also the work, in advance 
itself, of grace with unites human creatures to the Creator»133.
oakes observes that the principle objection to this contention of De 
Lubac and Milbank is how to preserve the gratuity of grace if the natural 
desire cannot be in vain. He points out that, for Milbank, De Lubac re-
solves the «paradox» of the spiritual creature by a revisionary ontology. For 
De Lubac, «the presence of spirit in the cosmos requires a revision in the 
standard terms under which the debates on grace and nature took place»134. 
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The spirit is a different kind of nature from other natural ones. As oakes 
describes it, «To be spirit is to be receptive; moreover, it is to be conscious of 
reception»135.
oakes sees that Milbank interprets St Thomas to view the relationship 
of nature and grace according to an image of an artist creating something out 
a raw material. Citing Milbank, «Just as human beings, fulfill, for example, 
the proper potential of wood by making a table and yet wood would never ‘ta-
bleize’ by itself, but needs to be ‘given’ the form of a table, so we are elevated 
(with the angels) by a divine art that does not abolish but fulfills our nature, 
though in a contingent, unexpected way»136.
Milbank is not content, however, merely to establish a link between 
nature and grace in this way. oakes posits that Milbank’s book also sustains 
three other ancillary theses: 1) De Lubac’s theology was actually condemned 
by Humani generis. 2) von Balthasar’s theology is «not as consistently brilliant 
and revolutionary as De Lubac’s»137.  3) De Lubac and von Balthasar did not 
let De Lubac’s revised ontology affect their ecclesiology. Because this thesis is 
principally about De Lubac, we will not consider this second thesis, and only 
touch lightly on the third.
The first thesis of Milbank is particularly bold, especially as De Lubac 
and his supporters all failed to see in Human generis a condemnation of De 
Lubac’s work. oakes points out that Milbank uses the 1958 English transla-
tion by rosemary Sheed of The Mystery of the Supernatural. A later English 
edition, published in 1998 by Crossroad, includes that translation but adds an 
essay by David Schindler which mentions the letter from Cardinal Bea on the 
order of Pope Pius XII to De Lubac to thank the French Jesuit for his work 
and encourage him on his path138.
oakes questions Milbank’s interpretation of Humani generis as condemn-
ing De Lubac. He notes that, in the encyclical, «the pope is dealing with a 
pure hypothetical: He is condemning a denial of what god could (but did not 
in fact) do. De Lubac, however, is dealing solely with what god did do»139. 
oakes notes that Pius XII introduces pure nature as a «conceptual safeguard to 
the concept of the supernatural», the utility of which De Lubac did not in fact 
deny140. Milbank, however, «does his best to obscure» the fact that De Lubac 
assents to this idea of pure nature. In Le Mystère du surnaturel, De Lubac writes, 
«it is said that a universe might have existed in which man... would have his 
rational ambitions limited to some lower, purely human, beatitude. Certainly I 
do not deny it. But having said that, one is obliged to admit... that in our world 
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as it is this is not the case»141. For Milbank, this passage comes from a book 
that is «a declension from the bolder statements in Surnaturel, a devolution of 
boldness allegedly due to de Lubac’s craven obeisance to Humani generis»142. 
oakes claims, on the contrary, that «de Lubac is only clarifying and nuacing a 
position he consistently maintained, but which required a more subtle forma-
tion to take account of what he had never denied but which needed stressing 
after the encyclical’s publication»143. oakes points out that Milbank insists on 
a «binary approach to de Lubac (pope vs. persecuted Jesuit)» which deter-
mines how he reads De Lubac144.
oakes intuits that Milbank’s frustration with De Lubac’s «capitulation to 
papal authority», which for the Anglican theologian ended up in a less rad-
ical account of the supernatural and an incoherent ecclesiology, is rooted in 
a «common motif of all liberal ecclesiologies». oakes formulates that liberal 
ecclesiological motif: «the institutional and juridical aspects of the Church are 
always and by essence incompatible with the charismatic and sacramental»145. 
Milbank sees De Lubac’s ecclesiology as «the snag that threatens to undo de 
Lubac’s achievement». oakes, in contrast, charges that «Milbank’s ecclesi-
ology of binary opposites (to the extent he reveals it in his laconic asides)... 
threatens to undo his critque of De Lubac»146. oakes rightly asserts that one 
cannot read De Lubac’s theology of the supernatural apart from his ecclesiol-
ogy, especially as developed after the Second vatican Council.
If De Lubac fought what he saw as extrinsicism before the Council, he 
just as adamantly after it fought an intrinsicism which «so fuses nature and 
grace that anything natural becomes, by the very fact that it is natural, a form 
of grace, which again justifies secular man!»147 given radical orthodoxy’s 
evacuation of a properly philosophical or secular sphere from theology, and 
Milbank’s radicalized reading of De Lubac, oakes touches on a neuralgic 
point here. Milbank risks the very intrinsicism that De Lubac’s ecclesiology 
fought against. For oakes, this ecclesiology is not incoherent with De Lubac’s 
theology of the supernatural. on the contrary, «Intrinsicism comes to the 
opposite conclusion as extrinsicism but uses the same logic»148, a logic which 
ends up justifying secular independence from religion.
While oakes admits that Milbank’s book is «provocative and worth read-
ing», he also proposes that «its theses are too controversial, its citation of the 
supporting literature too cursory, its formulations too gnomic, its exposure to 
the total corpus of de Lubac’s writings too sketchy, to make the book convinc-
ing»149.
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3.2. Hütter
The other article in the Book Symposium on Feingold’s work chosen for 
consideration here is by reinhard Hütter. He begins his article by identifying 
the exact problematic that underlies the discussion of the supernatural prob-
lematic.
Is human nature, due to its constitutive end being genuinely transcendent, 
already originally graced in a way such that the inchoate dynamic fulfillment of 
this end must be understood as an intensification –albeit an infinite intensifica-
tion– of this original grace to its eventual fulfillment and vice versa, the original 
grace as nothing else than the very anticipation of the eventual fulfillment? In 
short, isn’t it all a matter of fundamentally the same grace, just of gradations in 
intensity? Isn’t human nature itself most fundamentally but a function of grace?150
Hütter notes this way of conceiving the problem in origen of Alexandria 
(ca. 185-254), gregory of Nyssa (ca. 335-ca. 394), De Lubac and Milbank, 
as well as the russian orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944). It 
is very different than the vision held by St Augustine, St Thomas, and the 
Thomistic commentatorial tradition, which held that
because the human being has been made capable of this [supernatural] end 
(capax Dei) by god, human nature is in no way transmuted into something 
else by such an end. However, since this end utterly transcends every aspect of 
created human nature, there can be no innate natural desire whatsoever in the 
human being for this end... To perfect human nature instead of transmuting it, 
this gift from above must indeed be met by a corresponding conditional desire, 
hence a desire not innate to human nature itself, but elicited. This unique, con-
ditional openness to the supernatural, the attainment of god, has been unders-
tood as a specific obediential potency, specific because of the very constitution of 
the human rational soul and its intellective and volitional faculties151.
It was these two divergent schools of thought on the supernatural ques-
tion which were at stake in the debate over Surnaturel. They are also at stake 
in the renewal of that debate that Hütter suggests has been awoken anew by 
the publication of the interventions of the Toulouse Colloquium, Feingold’s 
doctoral dissertation and Milbank’s book.
Hütter’s article centers around three main observations. His first obser-
vation is that Feingold’s work should be taken seriously. He notes that this 
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book is «a study more extensive in scope than Surnaturel»152 and challenges 
De Lubac’s widely accepted charge that Cajetan had falsified St Thomas on 
the natural desire for god. Hütter also notes that this challenge has not been 
welcomed in certain quarters, and cites Milbank’s book as evidence. Hütter 
seems particularly vexed by Milbank’s consistent referring to his adversary 
as Feinberg instead of Feingold153, but even more by the British professor’s 
insinuation that Feingold supporters must also be supporters of «the Spanish 
Inquisition, a defender of the Papal States, and an admirer of the Franco-, 
vichy, and Pinochet regimes in addition to anything else implied by associa-
tion as arch-reactionary»154. Such a visceral reaction on the part of Milbank, 
however, is understandable, for «very few of Milbank’s readers will be able 
to double-check the all too quick dismissal of a serious piece of theological 
scholarship the implications of which are... less than supportive of Milbank’s 
own project»155.
But why has Milbank, and by extension others in the theological estab-
lishment, reacted so vehemently to this work? Hütter goes several reasons. 
First, for many contemporary theologians, theology can only be done in a 
«historical-contextual and constructivist mode». A «propositional discourse 
as informed by metaphysical realism and discursive, conceptual argumenta-
tion» such as that of Feingold is dismissed as «outdated»156. The fact that 
Feingold in his work proceeds with just such a discourse as if Aristotelian 
Thomistic metaphysics had not been declared dead long ago provokes even 
those who, like Milbank, are interested in St Thomas’ thought. Second, be-
cause Feingold writes in the style of a Thomistic commentator and not in the 
more narrative style common today, he is rejected. Far from what Milbank 
charges is «the equivalent of ‘Protestant fundamentalism’ and its proposition-
al proof-texting», Feingold «insists on engaging De Lubac’s own account» by 
way of the rigorous conceptual discourse of the Thomistic commentatorial 
tradition157.
Yet this obsession on the part of contemporary theologians with a narra-
tive style of historical and hermeneutical approaches to theology was pointed 
out by Blessed Pope John Paul II to be insufficient for Catholic theology158. 
Hütter observes that, because Milbank is «unencumbered by the normative 
doctrinal commitments» that inform De Lubac and Feingold’s work, he can-
not fathom why Catholic theologians «operate under the presupposition that 
the dogmatic tradition as well as the living magisterium constitutively inform 
theology’s formal object»159. As a result, Milbank is conditioned to see parts 
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of De Lubac’s project as incomprehensible capitulations to authority. He then 
feels that he can dispense with magisterial pronouncements that De Lubac 
would never have dismissed in such a cursory fashion160.
Hütter’s second observation is that the St Thomas presented by Mil-
bank is not, shall we say, the Historical St Thomas, but an Aquinas mediated 
by what Hütter labels radicalized Bulgakovian Lubacianism. We have already 
observed how Milbank consciously seeks to radicalize De Lubac by bring-
ing forth what he thinks are the logical consequences of De Lubac’s thought 
the French Jesuit was too scared to formulate as such for fear of the roman 
Catholic hierarchy. Hütter also suggests that Milbank essentially views De 
Lubac’s thought through the prism of Bulgakov, although he does not explain 
how161. For Milbank, the two gifts of created nature and graced nature «are 
to be seen in a continuum, a seamless dynamic of varying intensity, reflecting 
an ontological élan drawing the entire cosmos through humanity to beati-
tude»162. He also suggests that this cannot claim St Thomas, for whom there 
is clearly a double gratuity, as its patron.
Hütter writes that St Thomas presents four arguments which obviate the 
possibility of his being recruited as a patron for Milbank’s scheme. First, the 
Angelic Doctor sustains that «human nature stands in need of the gratuitous 
will of god in order to be lifted up [elevetur] to god, since this is above its 
natural capability»163. Second, human nature stands in a passive relationship 
to the active specific agency of god, an agency which presupposes human 
nature and is distinct from both the creation of man ex nihilo and the creatio 
continuans by which god sustains the creature in being. Third, human nature 
is elevated to god by the operations of nature, intellect and will, and not by 
nature considered apart from those faculties. Fourth, St Thomas clearly dis-
tinguishes between an end proportionate to nature and another end which 
«exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature»164. Hütter then claims 
that St Thomas «resists Milbank’s attempt of assimilating his theology into 
the latter’s radicalized Bulgakovian Lubacianism» for two more reasons. First, 
St Thomas conceives of nature as having «its own relative but proper integ-
rity as an entailment of creation that ontologically obtains and is accessible to 
the intellect». Second, St Thomas’ teaching on predestination is contrary to 
Milbank’s vision of universal apokatastasis165.
Hütter’s third observation is that Milbank rejects Feingold because he is 
convinced that the American theologian’s object is to restore a garrigou-La-
grange type position in which convenientia is seen as the «epistemological like-
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lihood» of supernatural elevation. Yet this is not the case for Feingold, who es-
pouses the more nuanced approach to convenientia as having more ontological 
than epistemological overtones, the same as the Toulouse Thomists praised 
by Milbank.
At the conclusion of these observations made in dialogue with Feingold 
and Milbank’s work, Hütter indicates that several things have become clear 
as this debate continues. First, apokatastasis as understood by Bulgakov and 
Milbank is indeed the logical consequence of De Lubac’s theology of the su-
pernatural in Surnaturel. Second, the idea that the renaissance Baroque com-
mentatorial tradition has falsified the true thought of St Thomas must be 
abandoned. Third, a reading of St Thomas «reconstructed in light of an Are-
opagite ontology of participation, in order to help warrant the vision of a Bul-
gakovian Lubacianism» is not consistent with the actual texts of St Thomas.
The idea of De Lubac and Milbank, which practically concludes that «all 
is grace», does indeed necessitate that «everything that has been brought into 
being must have its end in god, by necessary ontological entailment»166. This 
idea, which Hütter calls a «grandiose speculative vision»167, is not, however, 
the teaching of the Scriptures or of the Catholic Church, which leads us to 
conclude then, that perhaps, not everything is grace after all.
3.3. Long
In 2010, Steven Long published a book entitled Natura Pura: On the 
Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace. Four of its five chapters are reprints 
of previous articles published elsewhere. The most important of these articles 
appeared in Nova et vetera in 2007, as part of the Book Symposium on Fein-
gold’s work, and is entitled, «on the Loss, and the recovery, of Nature as a 
Theonomic Principle: reflections on the Nature/grace Controversy». our 
examination takes in to account this article as well material from other articles 
as reprinted in Natura Pura.
Long notes at the outset that roman Catholic theologians today, if they 
even consider the supernatural question at all, «incline to accept an account 
of the relation of nature and grace that dissolves the entire structure of human 
nature and its proportionate end into a pure posit or limit concept»168. They 
deny that man has a proportionate natural end, or deny that it is intelligible 
apart from grace. Long asserts that this has come about, not because of a 
certain understanding of grace, but from a warped understanding of nature. 
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Against these theologians, Long claims, «nature is not merely a negative con-
cept, a sort of empty theological Newtonian space providing a hollow ‘place’ 
or vacuole for grace»169. 
Long alleges that De Lubac «inherits a reduced and anti-theistic idea 
of ‘nature’» and an «absolutization of the libertarian idea that human free-
dom lies naturally outside the divine causality and providence»170. Because of 
this, De Lubac considered it essential to deny a natural proportionate end to 
human nature distinct from the supernatural one. Long asserts that the pre-
suppositions De Lubac harbored about nature were false. The objective Long 
presents for himself is the recovery of the idea of pure nature.
Long defines pure nature in the following way by two descriptions. For 
him it is the doctrine «that even here and now, in the concrete order, there 
is impressed upon each human person a natural order to the proximate, pro-
portionate, natural end from which the species of man is derived, an end that 
is in principle naturally knowable and distinct fro the final and supernatural 
end». It also shows that «the human person could without injustice have been 
created with this natural ordering alone, outside sanctifying grace, in puris 
naturalibus, and without the further ordering of man to supernatural beatific 
vision»171. 
For Long, this teaching on pure nature is that of St Thomas and the 
Thomistic commentators, the same teaching that Feingold vindicates as «a 
potent challenge for those who assume –on the warrant of De Lubac’s claim– 
that most of St Thomas’ commentators have preferred ‘renaissance corrup-
tions’ to the genuine teaching of Aquinas»172. Long claims that Feingold’s 
work «establishes both systematically and exegetically» that this contention 
of De Lubac and his followers is false. Among De Lubac’s followers, Long 
singles out Milbank and his book The Suspended Middle for perpetuating the 
falsehood.
For Long, the falsehood of De Lubac and Milbank «fails to discern the 
larger stage on which the loss of nature as a theonomic principle has been 
played, and the distortive results it has both in prejudicing the nature/grace 
question, and for theology as a whole»173. one of Long’s central themes is that 
nature is not a vacuole for grace, a kind of non-entity suspended in the middle 
of the supernatural. For him, nature is a principle which he terms theonomic174. 
Nature is not to be conceived as a vacuole for grace independent of god. For 
Long, St Thomas clearly taught that «human nature is defined in its species 
in relation to the natural and proximate end as distinct from the supernatural 
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beatific end»175. St Thomas’ teaching that man possesses potentia obedientia-
lis, which explains how supernatural acts are our own, and at the same time 
brought about by grace176. Because De Lubac thought of potentia obedientialis 
as a «mere generic susceptibility to miracle»177, and not the way St Thomas 
thought of it, De Lubac rejects it.
Long notes that part of the difficulty in assessing St Thomas’ thought 
is the existence of the two series of texts which seem to present two varying 
interpretations of natural desire. Because De Lubac ignores the second set of 
texts, he does not pick up on the fact that for St Thomas, god is man’s natural 
end, but as First Cause of effects, not as The Triune god of revelation. Long 
argues that, «failure to attend to such texts naturally inclines one to read the 
first set of texts... as straightforward and unproblematic, whereas in Thomas 
they exist within a wider philosophical and theological context necessary to 
their interpretation»178. That context is precisely how St Thomas considers 
man as an intellectual creature.
De Lubac’s reading of the first series of texts does raise very important 
questions. Long lists two. First, what is the natural desire for God and what is 
its object? Second, what does it mean for this desire to be natural? De Lubac re-
jects Cajetan’s answers to these questions, charging him with creating a «layer 
cake» of nature and grace. Long sustains that Cajetan actually suggests «that 
the natural desire for god is modalized by the state in which nature exists, so 
that this desire would be found in one way had god not created man from 
the beginning within the privileged life of sanctifying grace, and is found in 
another in the context of man’s creation in the state of grace and of the data 
of supernatural revelation»179. This idea of modalization is important. The 
natural desire for god, which for Long is specified by natural knowledge, 
consequent on the ordination of natural intellect to being, elicited upon that 
knowledge and not efficacious of itself to reach god, exists in different ways. 
Apart from revelation, the natural desire for god would exist, but only on the 
condition of its possibility. With revelation, that changes. The desire is no 
longer conditional upon the possibility of knowing the cause of effects; under 
grace, it becomes the possibility of reaching the god of revelation. «The 
ratio of cause of these effects is incorporated within the graced desire of god 
as God»180. In consequence, «this idea of the modalization of the natural desire 
according to the states in which it may be found, contextualizes it in relation 
to grace»181. grace, then, while it is extrinsic to human nature, does work 
within human nature to elevate it.
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Long finds the idea of nature as a vacuole particularly abhorrent. For 
him, it «seems to make the doctrine of Nicea to be unintelligible»182. The 
Nicean definition of the union of divine and human natures in Christ makes 
De Lubac’s understanding of human nature circular. It would be tantamount 
to saying, «The Person of the Word assumed the nature that is defined by 
its being assumed by the Person of the Word»183. Long also notes that, 
while it is true that St Thomas held that there was only one supernatural 
end for man, the beatific vision, that does not «rule out an end proportion-
ate to nature that is further ordered in grace to the ultimate supernatural 
finality»184. 
Long has a developed understanding of what nature is and how it can 
applied to the supernatural question. Nature is the «preamble to grace, and 
not merely its postscript», as he implicitly accuses De Lubac of making nature 
into merely a postscript to grace, or «the point without magnitude that termi-
nates the line of grace»185. Furthermore, De Lubac’s idea of nature «anticipating 
grace» is incoherent with the fact that «[s]ince powers are distinguished by 
acts, and acts by objects, and objects by ends, to distinguish between the two 
orders is to acknowledge that the natural end is distinct from, and less perfect 
than, the supernatural end»186. In fact, it is precisely sanctifying grace which 
orders nature in a causally efficacious way to its supernatural end. In conse-
quence, sin does not revert man back to a state of pure nature, even though it 
does harm man’s nature. The way in which man is naturally ordered to god 
is less than the way he is ordered to god as his supernatural end by grace. But 
the fact that man reaches god, in his human nature, by grace, indicates that 
nature «is not an arena of autonomy from god: all created being and action 
derive from god as First Cause»187. 
Long assimilates Feingold’s interpretation of St Thomas that man’s nat-
ural desire for god is an elicited one consequent upon knowledge of god as 
First Cause and that this desire is perfected only by grace, to bring man to his 
supernatural end, the god of the beatific vision. What Long adds to Fein-
gold’s account is that this truth also tells us something about human nature 
itself: it is a preamble to grace which is still under the law of god. Nature, 
then, is a theonomic principle, and man is not merely an autonomous creature 
who can live in a world entirely separate from the law of god.
The discussion of man’s orientation towards god necessarily involves 
what is called natural teleology, namely, the consideration of how man tends 
towards his end in a natural way. For Long, De Lubac and other «theologians 
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no longer consider themselves in need of understanding natural motion and natural 
teleology. Yet if ever there were a question that requires natural teleology... surely 
it is the question of the natural desire for god»188. Taking into account the 
natural teleology of man, potentia obedientialis «enables the creature to receive 
from god an actuation radically disproportionate to its unassisted nature and 
natural potencies». Seen in this way, the assertion of a connatural end for man 
proportionate to his nature and a potentia obedientialis in human nature is far 
from what De Lubac feared as naturalism. on the contrary, «it is the exaltation 
of the supernatural order that follows from these considerations»189.
In contrast, if one considers man without a connatural proportionate 
end, with no reference to a natural teleology, and refusing to admit a potentia 
obedientialis in human nature, one can see how De Lubac then had to posit 
a man with only a supernatural end and consequently was forced to see the 
alternative as a nature independent of god and the supernatural. But Long 
claims that the presuppositions upon which De Lubac based his rejection of 
those things do not obtain. De Lubac «was inclined to conflate insistence 
upon the distinction between the end proportionate to nature and the super-
natural finis ultimus with a naïve naturalism»190. For Long, De Lubac essen-
tially substitutes another conception of end for the philosophical definition of 
it in St Thomas, «for which the only justification was its putative efficacy in saving 
the Christian intellect from the danger of naturalism»191.
Precisely because man’s nature is not «transmuted» into something else, 
but elevated by grace, it has to be capable of being elevated. This capacity, or 
potency, is the potentia obedientialis. It is a specific potency to be elevated to 
god, not a general potency to become anything. As Long describes it, «man 
may be elevated to the higher life of grace and the divine friendship, because 
the spiritual nature is such that with divine aid it may be so uplifted»192. If 
potentia obedientialis is seen as merely a transmutation of human nature (and 
rejected on that basis), then its fulfillment in supernatural life would result in 
the transmutation and loss of human nature. Long notes that, if this is what 
potentia obedientialis was, De Lubac would be right to reject it. But it is not. 
Therefore, «if natural powers are of themselves insufficient for desiring the 
supernatural good that exceeds the proportion of human nature, might this 
not mean the natural desire for god is in itself a desire specified not by uncre-
ated nature –which is literally unknowable apart from revelation– but by that 
created nature in relation to whose existential dependence the reality of god 
is discovered?»193
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Long maintains that De Lubac’s incorrect reading of potentia obedientialis 
leads him to false conclusions about the relationship between nature and the 
supernatural in man. The American professor does, however, approve of the 
fact that De Lubac was motivated to his study for a good reason. The Enlight-
enment view of human nature as «a separate jurisdiction from divine authority 
and governance»194 had become widespread. This view had gained credence 
even within Catholic theology, after Molina posited that it was «acceptable to 
view free human action as standing outside of divine governance and causali-
ty»195. Nature ceased to be a theonomic principle.
The question of how man was related to his end, teleology, was ignored. 
De Lubac raised the teleological question of man again, but for Long, he 
stressed it too much. We could also say that perhaps De Lubac extended a 
supernatural teleological view of man beyond its conceptual borders to sub-
sume a valid natural teleological view of man. In other words, «De Lubac 
was correct in seeking the answer in teleology, and correct again in seek-
ing an answer that would once again establish the theonomic character of 
natural order». At the same time, however, he was incorrect «in supposing 
that natural teleology in itself could be shoehorned into or equated with a 
supernatural trajectory». In doing so, he turned nature into a vacuole and 
«paradoxically completed the ontological evacuation of nature to which» 
he sought to respond196. De Lubac attempts to re-establish what Long calls 
the theonomic in nature, but «at the cost of a certain confusedly volatile 
conflation of supernatural and natural dynamisms»197. Long summarizes his 
critique of De Lubac’s theology of the supernatural, as a «flight from intel-
ligible metaphysical abstraction, the reductio of nature to a mere dialectical 
limit concept... so as to render it merely a ‘Newtonian empty space’ awaiting 
revelation and grace»198.
Without a rigorously metaphysical understanding of nature as a theo-
nomic principle and not a vacuole for grace, it is easy to lapse into considering 
nature as «whatever the lingua franca of contemporary scientific culture and 
popular ideology may be»199. Apologetics, by which the Church proposes that 
the truths of the faith are not incompatible with human reason and human 
nature, becomes difficult, if not impossible. If nature is evacuated, as it were, 
by theology, by the lack of a proper vision of human nature, then when theol-
ogy engages with those whose idea of nature is that it is a priori incompatible 
with faith, there is no common language with which to pass from nature to 
the supernatural. For Long, the loss of nature as a theonomic principle is not 
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merely a foible of De Lubac’s theology. It spells disaster for the theological 
project to give reasons for the faith. The recovery of nature as a theonomic 
principle, and the subsequent renewal of theology, must include «the truths of 
metaphysics, natural philosophy and ethics, and anthropology» for Christian 
doctrine to be intelligible200. It cannot be left alone to a theology which some-
how feels it can work outside of those disciplines.
3.4. Balance of Reactions
It is very clear that Feingold’s work has exposed some of the lacunae of 
De Lubac’s thought. In doing so, it is ironically a work parallel to Surnaturel 
itself. De Lubac sought to challenge a widely accepted notion of the relation-
ship between nature and the supernatural. He sought to return to original 
sources to find what he thought would be a more authentic answer to the 
supernatural question, one which would have inestimable apologetic value for 
the Christian faith as lived in a world increasingly hostile to the supernatural. 
He also unwittingly, and perhaps naively, stirred up a hornet’s nest of opposi-
tion. Likewise, Feingold has done exactly the same.
But where De Lubac sought to adumbrate the true relationship of nature 
and the supernatural by means of a historical-critical reading of St Thomas 
and other thinkers, Feingold sought instead to pierce the systematic core of 
those same thinkers. In doing so, Feingold presents an account which both 
affirms De Lubac’s intuition on some points, but also mounts a devastating, 
and for some, definitive, critique of his thesis.
Many of De Lubac’s critics charged that he «supernaturalized» the nat-
ural. Long claims that he emptied the natural of all meaning, turning it into 
something unintelligible. This critique of Feingold and Long does not square 
with Milbank’s appropriation of De Lubac for his project of radical ortho-
doxy. It also does not sit well with many theologians who have uncritically 
accepted De Lubac’s account of what happened after St Thomas in the super-
natural debate. Because that account is the cornerstone of radical orthodoxy’s 
self-understanding and much of the theological anthropology taught in facul-
ties of theology today, this renewal of the debate has led to a critical examina-
tion, once again, of the thorny problem of the supernatural.
Surnaturel was not merely a novel thesis about the interpretation of the 
natural desire for god according to St Thomas. It was an indictment of an en-
tire way of doing Catholic theology for centuries and a suggestion that some 
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of the basic givens of doctrine had to be rethought from top to bottom if 
theology were to provide a convincing apologetic for the faith. As Long has 
described, that project has ended up eviscerating the possibility of such an 
apologetic from the body of theology. The Natural Desire to See God Accord-
ing to St Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters boldly infers that the crisis De 
Lubac’s thesis caused theology was itself an unintentional, but nonetheless 
destructive, fabrication.
Long’s Natura Pura builds on Feingold’s analysis of St Thomas’ teach-
ing on the supernatural, but is principally about the urgency of recover-
ing that classical Thomist account of nature and the supernatural he deems 
necessary for a fruitful dialogue with the postmodern world. He does not 
directly engage Milbank’s criticism of Feingold at all. But it remains clear 
that, even though Long and Milbank both seek to engage postmodern man 
with an apologetic for orthodox Christian doctrine, they are diametrically 
opposed as to how to go about it. For Milbank, such an apologetic can only 
come about by denying any autonomy for the natural and any separation of 
the natural from the supernatural. For Long, the loss of nature as a theo-
nomic principle and the conversion of nature into a vacuole of grace, which 
is how he views De Lubac (and we may assume, Milbank) on nature, makes 
such a dialogue impossible.
Hütter intuits that the ensuing paralysis of theology has been caused 
by the submission of theology «to the thoroughly modern political geog-
raphy of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in order to situate and prejudice matters doctrinal 
and theological, a habit, surely by now as widespread as it is thoughtless... 
condemning matters of theological enquiry and discourse to... the final do-
mestication of matters ecclesial and theological under the extrinsically su-
perimposed rubrics of political liberalism»201. The nouvelle théologie began 
as an attempt to allow for a greater theological pluralism in the search for 
proposing the timeless doctrines of faith to modern man. The theology of 
the supernatural of De Lubac was crucial to that project. But hidden within 
that project were dynamics, unforeseen by anyone in the first half of the 
twentieth century, that, in collusion with the nihilism of post-modernism, 
endangered the very aim and purpose of the Catholic theology it so desper-
ately hoped to renew.
The question now becomes, how can Catholic theology be freed from 
those dynamics to propose to the world a true understanding of the relation-
ship between nature and the supernatural in man?
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4. reinhard hütter and the current StatuS QuaeStiOniS
In 2009, The Thomist published an article of Duke University theologian rein-
hard Hütter, «Aquinas on the Natural Desire for the vision of god: A relec-
ture of Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 25 Après Henri De Lubac». The very 
title of this article is informative of Hütter’s objective. First of all, it suggests 
that we are now in a time après De Lubac, which further intimates that the De 
Lubac moment, the hegemony of De Lubac as exegete of the supernatural 
question, is over. one can infer from Hütter’s earlier dialogue with Feingold 
and Milbank that, for him at least, it is now time to move beyond, or at least 
around, De Lubac, and re-engage St Thomas stripped of its Delubacian/Mil-
bankian declension. Second, he proposes a re-lecture, a fresh new examination 
of one of the key texts to interpreting St Thomas’ thought on the supernatural.
We propose this article of Hütter as a kind of status quaestionis of the 
supernatural question as it has emerged from the initial forge of the debate 
as re-ignited by Feingold and Milbank. It should be said from the outset that 
such a proposition is bound to be controversial. As we have seen, the manuals 
of theology, histories of theology and articles about theology in the past thirty 
years have created a consensus generally positive about De Lubac’s theology 
of the supernatural, even while recognizing some of its lacunae. The posi-
tion of Feingold has entered upon this comfortable body of thought as a cold 
shower. There is no indication that it has been accepted widely in the theolog-
ical academy. But the provocation is there, and it must be considered. Hütter 
to his credit sees that any further discussion of the supernatural after 2010 
must take into account Feingold’s work as surely as any discussion after 1946 
had to take into account Surnaturel. In this way, Hütter can be said to give us 
some sense of the status quaestionis as the debate moves into the second decade 
of the Third Millennium of Christianity.
Hütter notes that De Lubac’s thesis, which he summarizes as, «human 
nature tends in itself necessarily towards god»202, enjoyed widespread accept-
ance. The first challenges to that consensus, which Hütter identifies as the 
2000 Toulouse Colloquium and the work Le désir de Dieu: Sur les traces de saint 
Thomas, by georges Cardinal Cottier,203 went unnoticed in the English-speak-
ing world. The publication of Feingold’s work in English was noticed because 
of his argument that «de Lubac’s intervention, while arguably settling in a 
possibly irreversible way a once dominant minimizing interpretation of Aqui-
nas, turns out not to have been the last word on this matter»204.
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For Hütter, the opposing tendencies toward minimalist and maximalist 
interpretation of St Thomas on the natural desire for god come from reading 
the well-noted double series of texts in an opposing manner. Since, out of all 
of those texts, chapter 25 of Summa Contra Gentiles III tends to be the one key 
to the maximalist interpretation,205 Hütter suggests that the same text can also 
be used to read the two series of texts as one, thus obviating the need to read 
them as two sets of texts engendering two opposing interpretations. In doing 
so, he also suggests that two now long-forgotten works, William o’Connor’s 
The Eternal Quest: The Teaching of St Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Desire 
for God and Marie-Joseph guillou’s critique of De Lubac, can be useful in 
restoring a unitary vision of the texts, and by extension, a unified vision of St 
Thomas on the natural desire for god206.
For Hütter, it is important to realize that the material to be found in SCg 
III is «a metaphysical inquiry into the ontological structure of created substance»207. 
It is not about «the concrete givens of the one obtaining order of providence 
in which angels and humans de facto exist»208. As a result, an attempt such as 
that of De Lubac «to read particular statements or conclusions from Aquinas’ 
precisely delimited metaphysical argumentation here as prima facie theological 
claims about the obtaining order of providence as it coincides with the economy 
of salvation can only obfuscate the status of the conclusions reached¡»209.
It is also important to take into consideration St Thomas’ foreword to 
SCg Iv. Here, he writes of two ways in which human intellect can come to 
know god. The first is «by a descent of perfections from god.» The second 
is «beginning with lower things and gradually ascending to the first cause¡»210. 
The weakness of our intellect points to our inability to even know what the 
ways we can come to know god are. It follows then that there are two types of 
wisdom: a wisdom that comes from human enquiry, and a wisdom that comes 
from the gratuitous revelation of the divine. god offers man a way by which 
«human beings are elevated to a perfect knowledge of him, the unmediated vi-
sion of god that effectively unites human beings to him such that they become 
‘partakers of the divine nature’ (divinae consortes naturae [2 Pet 1:4])»211. The 
perfection of human nature, which that wisdom brings, is achieved by man’s 
reaching his ultimate end. Thus, Hütter posits, there is a universal teleology 
which explains how every created being, by participating according to the 
mode of its being, returns to its source. This is another explanation of what is 
referred to classically as St Thomas’ concept of exitus-redditus, that creation 
as an effect comes forth from god and returns to Him as its cause and source.
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Within every creature, however, there is a dual perfection. The first per-
fection is in virtue of its nature, and the second in virtue of its operation. 
Thus, «[w]hatever is constitutive of intellectual beings (i.e., inherent to their 
primary perfection, their nature), is not in and of itself efficacious in achieving 
their final end, for intellectual beings are» fallible212.
Furthermore, St Thomas in SCg III introduces the idea of what consti-
tutes an agent that intends and acts. Agency is an analogical term. Therefore, 
since «every effect has a certain similarity with its cause, creation indeed im-
itates its first cause in the most important respect: agency»213. Hütter quotes 
Cottier as pointing out the dynamic vision which links the agency of god and 
that of creatures, «Under the attraction of god, ultimate end and summum 
bonum, created being tends, in the measure according to which it is possible 
for it, toward a maximum of actualized being»214. That ultimate end is the 
good for which the creature acts. The metaphysical inquiry into how the pri-
mary perfection –the nature– of the created being acts by its secondary per-
fection –the operations of nature, which in man are intellect and will– clearly 
reveals something about the ontological structure of that nature. That nature 
possesses a specific capacity to be moved to its proper perfection. Hütter notes 
that this specific capacity in man is the intellect.
The end towards which man acts by means of the specific capacity that is 
his intellect is god. Because all things tend toward god suo modo, according to 
their mode of existing, the creature whose specific capacity is intellect tends 
to god via the intellect.
In SCg chapter 19, St Thomas introduces the concept of similitude, that 
each thing tends towards being and act, towards its perfection and goodness, 
in the mode proper to it. Therefore, the intellectual creature, tends to god via 
the specific capacity of its intellect by way of a likeness to god, who is Pure 
Being and Pure Act.
This gleaning of various principles across the Summa Contra Gentiles 
allows Hütter to make a conclusion. There is a distinction between «those 
agents whose secondary perfection comes about simply by way of their na-
tures» and those «whose secondary perfection comes about by way of intel-
lect»215. In creatures without intellect, ontological appetite determines their 
end, much like the idea of pondus naturae discussed earlier. In creatures with 
intellect, the ratio boni, the reason for which they act towards the good, de-
termines their end216. The good has to be explicit to the intellect by way of 
knowledge for the will to incline toward it as an end. As Hütter reformulates 
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this principle, «I can only be drawn by my rational appetite, the will, to a good 
that I first of all understand as a worthwhile end»217.
This divine intellect, which attracts created human intellect, is not so 
different from created human intellect that the two are «absolutely foreign to 
each other»218. As St Augustine wrote, «Just as we must acknowledge that the 
human soul is not what god is, so it is to be set down that among all things 
that god has created nothing is nearer to god» than man219. For this reason, 
human intellect is capax Dei, and its understanding, enabled from within, aris-
es concretely from without. Although Hütter does not say so, it seems that 
this is where De Lubac understood that there was something in the nature of 
spirit that is the human intellect that enabled knowledge of god from within, 
as it were, man’s ontological core. What De Lubac missed was that this was an 
interior enablement, or shall we dare to say, a potentia obedientialis, which only 
the agency of god through grace coming concretely from outside the human 
person could perfect into the elevation of human nature to god.
All of the above Hütter employs as a preamble to his exegesis of SCg 
chapter 25. There St Thomas writes, «an intellectual substance tends to di-
vine knowledge as to an ultimate end.»220 Because intellectual knowledge 
tends towards the most perfect intelligible object, «god must be the most 
perfect thing in the genus of the operation of understanding: hence it is the ul-
timate end of that being whose proper operation is intelligere»221. This is true 
as a metaphysical analysis of the ontological structure of the intellect, whether 
the operation of human intellect goes on in the state of original Justice, in the 
state of original Sin, or in the state of actual sin.
The operation of the appetite of nature cannot go on indefinitely; if it 
did, the desiderium naturae would be frustrated. So to what is that operation 
directed? For St Thomas, according to Hütter, «contemplation of the high-
est cause is the concrete terminus of the secondary perfection of the human 
intellect»222. The end of contemplation of the highest cause and the onto-
logical structural possibility to attain it (intellect) «is the condition for the 
desire of nature (desiderium naturae) to tend towards its fulfillment by way of 
the appetite of nature (appetitus naturae), realized most eminently in the will, 
the rational appetite as it moves the intellect to its proper good and hence 
perfection in contemplating the most excellent object, the first cause»223. This 
movement of the will to contemplate via the intellect the First Cause causes 
wonder, admiratio. But since the First Cause is beyond what the intellect can 
reach, «the felicitas sought by way of metaphysical contemplation must neces-
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sarily remain incomplete»224. Hence, natural desire is not ontologically prior 
to knowledge. Instead «it is its entailment and arises simultaneously with the 
intellect’s encounter with reality»225.
The ultimate perfection of man, the terminus in which man’s natural 
desire can rest, is that beatitudo which is attained only by grace. But this per-
fection of man in the beatific vision cannot be had without a nature for it be 
had in. The concrete order of historically existing man, as De Lubac describes 
what Hütter terms the extant order of providence, coincides with the econ-
omy of salvation, of how god acts in history to save man, not because of any 
exigency in human nature itself, but because of convenientia.
Hütter calls to mind the crux of Le guillou’s critique of De Lubac.
«[w]hile Aquinas indeed held the natural desire for the vision of god, this 
affirmation is fundamentally different from, albeit essentially related to, the 
desire for the supernatural, a desire elicited by the supernatural virtue of hope. 
The latter desire is fundamentally different because it is supernaturally elicited; 
however, it is essentially related to the natural desire, because it is that very 
natural desire (conditional by nature) that is presupposed as well as perfected 
by the supernaturally elicited desire»226.
But what remains then, to be said of nature in its own integrity relative to 
the supernatural? For Le guillou, pure nature is not an invented nature which 
would have nothing to do with concretely existing man, as De Lubac claimed. 
rather, natura pura «designates in our world the very structure proper to the 
created intellect»227.
In other words, pure nature is not a pure fantasy of a man who can hap-
pily exist apart from god. Pure nature is not merely a control concept used 
to assure that god’s freedom in granting grace is preserved from some notion 
that human nature somehow can demand that grace. Pure nature is purely 
what man’s nature is, considered in its own integrity, relative to the life of 
supernatural grace in the beatific vision to which it is called, and which can be 
attained only through the elevation of that nature through grace.
Hütter’s article allows us to come to some conclusions about the theology 
of the supernatural that are different than the ones to which De Lubac came. 
We can affirm wholeheartedly with De Lubac that man is capax Dei. He is 
ontologically oriented towards god and in him is to be found a fittingess, a 
convenientia, as an «opening inscribed into the very core of the nature of the 
human intellectus, created» in the image of god228. But, against De Lubac, 
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we must also affirm other things. First, precisely because there is one final 
end, we must distinguish between two orders of finality. The gratuity of the 
ultimate end can only be preserved if there is a finality which corresponds to 
the natural faculties of created intellect. Without this natural finality, there is 
no potency which grace can presuppose and perfect in man’s nature. If man is 
to be elevated to his supernatural end as a man, and not to be transmuted or 
re-created into something he is not, the gratuitous transcendence of the final 
supernatural end presupposes that man has a nature which is integral, and 
also open to such an elevation. Hütter notes that, for St Thomas, «there can-
not exist an innate, unconditional natural desire for the supernatural»229. For 
Hütter, De Lubac, and by extension Milbank, has «overshot the goal.» The 
correct way to describe the relationship of human nature to the supernatural 
in the economy of salvation, in this world god has created is this: The natural, 
elicited, conditional and imperfect desire for God is perfected, by sanctifying grace, into 
the unconditional desire of the infused virtue of hope to see the God whom I know by 
faith as He is in Himself and as He is able to give Himself to me230.
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Thomas with being the originator of the «ambiguity» of pure nature, it hardly is meaningful 
to charge De Lubac with infidelity to the Angelic Doctor when he does not set out to elabo-
rate a thesis which is faithful to the letter of the Aquinate.
 68. While Pickstock remains at Cambridge, Ward is now at oxford and Milbank at Nottingham, 
still teaching theology.
 69. J. milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 1st ed., Blackwell, London; 2nd ed., Blackwell, oxford, 
2006.
 70. J. milbank, C. PickStOck and g. ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, rout-
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 82. Ibidem.
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 84. John milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Superna-
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 85. Ibidem.
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 89. Ibid., 24. Yet is the fact that De Lubac argues for a certain interpretation of St Thomas on 
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adequately evaluating De Lubac? Need the fact of its relevance be a mere pretext for neo-
Scholastic exploitation?
 90. Ibid., 23.
 91. Ibid., 33.
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 93. milbank, 36.
 94. Ibid., 37. Note that on p. 80, Milbank writes, «De Lubac’s thesis is more Thomist than Sco-
tist» in disbelief that «die-hard neo-Thomists» like Feingold still insist that DeLubac’s thesis 
is Scotist. Milbank appears here to hold contradictory views on whether De Lubac’s thesis is 
Scotist or not.
 95. Ibid., 39. This sounds much like Nicolas’ idea of a passerelle between nature and the superna-
tural.
 96. Ibid., 42.
 97. Ibid., 47.
 98. Ibid., 46-7.
 99. This is important for radical orthodoxy, for whom all knowledge is seen in terms of divine 
illumination. From a Thomistic perspective, however, one could point out that the transfi-
guration of the soul by the possession of the beatific vision does not explain how, in the soul 
who is in the state of grace but does not possess the beatific vision, for whom the soul has not 
been entirely transfigured into the light, gratuity can still be preserved.
 100. Ibid., 104. Milbank seems to minimize the role of the Magisterium in the life of the Catho-
lic theologian, along with that of papal authority. For him, presumably as an Anglican, De 
Lubac’s obedient reworking of his thesis was a lamentable capitulation to unjust restriction 
by an unjust authority, which undercut the French Jesuit’s creativity and risked sending his 
system into incoherence. one wonders whether De Lubac, as stung as he was by the machi-
nations around him, would view the role of papal authority and the Magisterium in the life 
of the theologian in quite the same light.
 101. Ibid., 107-8. At the end of his 108 page book on De Lubac, Milbank suggests something 
quite extraordinary as a key for understanding what he indicates is a real hidden intention of 
De Lubac as well as an open one of radical orthodoxy. «Never specifically consented to by 
De Lubac, but always exerting its own original lure, was origen’s vision of apocatastasis: the 
universal Christological salvation of spirits and through this, the eternal re-establishment of 
all things.» p. 108. If De Lubac’s covert intention were to pave a way for a recovery of this 
doctrine of origen, then Milbank is right in intuiting that De Lubac’s theology of the super-
natural provides the theological basis by which apocatastasis can be said to be coherent with 
the activity of the supernatural. It would also validate Cardinal Siri’s deep-seated suspicion 
of De Lubac as a closeted heretic. But if Milbank is wrong, and that was never De Lubac’s 
intention, then De Lubac’s reputation as an orthodox theologian remains intact. Milbank, 
by contrast, would be seen as dangerously extrapolating from De Lubac a desire to advance 
a theory which, even if radical orthodoxy were to find it congenial, the roman Catholic 
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Church would not hesitate to condemn, as she condemned origen for it in 543. Cfr. den-
zinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 203-11.
 102. Cfr. FeingOld, 315, note 71, citing At the Service of the Church, 184.
 103. milbank, 25-7, note 10.
 104. Ibid. Let us observe two things here. First, Feingold does not deny that the beatific vision 
is the telos of the spiritual creature. The apparent omission of what Milbank calls the «on-
tological and neoplatonizing prelude» is justifiable given that Feingold is attempting to de-
monstrate that natural desire is elicited, which he draws from paragraphs 11-13, and not 
attempting to deny that the desire is natural. Second, Milbank declares that De Lubac is right 
to reject pure nature because St Thomas indicates that the beatific vision has to be the end 
of spiritual creatures because otherwise something lower than spiritual creatures would have 
god as their end, which is not fitting. But again, desire is predicated of man differently than 
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advance his argument.
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it natural in the sense of not being elicited, because the nature of the intellectual creature 
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pretation of the quoted sections. For Milbank, the omitted sections prove the ontological 
nature of natural desire. Yet, Feingold does not question that the desire is natural. Because 
he recognizes the analogical character of nature and desire, Feingold cites what he cites to 
demonstrate that the natural desire is an elicited one. Also, after charging that Feingold 
proof-texts St Thomas like a Fundamentalist, Milbank then provides three quotes from St 
Thomas (ST I-II q5, a5, ad2, De veritate q 18, a1 ad 7, and ST III q9, a3) that are given as 
evidence of the desire being natural, something Feingold does not contest.
 108. Ibid. How is the natural desire to want to know the causes of effects, and then their essences, 
abstract?
 109. Ibid., 79.
 110. Ibid., 80. Cfr. J. dunS ScOtuS, Quodlibet 17, a2
 111. Ibidem.
 112. Ibid. Milbank refers to S.T. bOninO, article «La théorie des limnes et le mystère du surna-
turel chez saint Thomas d’Aquin» in the Toulouse Colloquium, Controversy, 117-54 (Eng. 
Ed), 131-66 (Fr. Ed.) It is unclear whether Milbank takes issue with how Bonino explains St 
Thomas on limbo, or whether he criticizes the very attempt to talk about limbo at all.
 113. Ibid., 81.
 114. Ibid., 83.
 115. He mentions Torrell and Narcisse specifically.
 116. Ibid., 83-4.
 117. Ibid., 84.
 118. Ibid., 85.
 119. Ibidem.
 120. Ibid., 84. Cfr. Controversy, 295-310. Convenientia is taken in the Scholastic sense of «fitting-
ness.» It differs from a strict demonstration, and denotes that there is something within 
Christopher smith
232 CUADErNoS DoCTorALES DE LA FACULTAD DE TEoLogíA / voL. 61 / 2014
the subject that means that what is predicated of it is fitting to it. In C.T. LEWIS and C. 
SHorT, A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews’ Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary. oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1879, the entry for convenientia indicates that it is originally a Ciceronian 
term. It can be defined as «a meeting together, agreement, accord, harmony, symmetry, conformity, 
suitableness, fitness.»
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 134. OakeS, 673.
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 143. OakeS, 681. A third possibility: De Lubac in 1946 did not actually believe in pure nature as 
Pius XII would later introduce it, but in Surnaturel he does not expressly state his denial. After 
Humani generis, he was able to reformulate his central thesis in such a way as to include the 
concept of pure nature as introduced by Pius XII, still excluding any more of a role given to 
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